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Introduction 
 
 
A multitude of public and private organizations engage in international standard-setting 
processes. Some organizations set technical standards to coordinate business or 
government behavior for a number of issue areas like the distribution of radio 
frequencies, international aviation, maritime classification and transportation, global 
communication systems, financial reporting and accounting, the size and shape of nuts 
and bolts, and the like. Other organizations set standards for international games and 
sports, governing everything from the organization of local chess clubs around the 
world to international football events. Some organizations develop standards for 
voluntary information disclosure: two examples are the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), a leading global standard in the field of nonfinancial reporting; and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public-private initiative created to 
increase the transparency of payments made by companies in the extractive industries to 
host governments. Other organizations, like the chemical industry’s Responsible Care, 
develop industrywide codes of conduct to promote specific principles, norms, and 
guidelines for environmentally responsible conduct.  
In recent years, however, non-state actors have created a new type of 
transnational institution in the shape of certification schemes that address environmental 
and social concerns in fisheries, forestry, tourism, coffee production, mining, and other 
industries. These certification schemes go beyond voluntary codes of conduct and self-
regulatory modes of governing, in that they involve the development of prescriptive 
environmental and social standards for certification, which require behavioral changes 
and independent verification of compliance (Cashore 2002). They are more demanding 
than government-sponsored corporate social responsibility initiatives such as the UN 
Global Compact – a set of ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor, 
the environment, and anti-corruption – which are not enforced. These new non-state 
certification schemes constitute governing arenas in which a wide range of stakeholders 
interact and agree upon rules and governance mechanisms (Bernstein and Cashore 
2007). The founders of these schemes often claim that they are more inclusive, 
transparent, democratic, and accountable than are many of the formal and informal 
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governance networks in the international and domestic domains. Finally, private 
companies participate in these certification schemes on a voluntary basis. Being created 
and governed by non-state actors, there is no use of legal coercion to make producers 
sign onto the schemes (Cashore 2002). Rather, activists and advocacy coalitions use a 
range of strategies to convince or pressure producers to participate.  
This thesis examines non-state governance schemes through the study of forest 
certification from the global to the domestic level, comparing it with fisheries 
certification. Forest certification is an appealing area of study because it arguably 
represents one of the most advanced and dynamic cases of non-state rulemaking and 
governance in the environmental realm (Cashore 2002). Although certification schemes 
were first developed through forestry initiatives, fisheries shared similar concerns: 
resource depletion, environmental degradation, and insufficient governmental action. 
This thesis compares forest and fisheries certification, to determine if the same 
mechanisms and processes can explain the emergence and effectiveness of certification 
schemes in two different sectors. I chose these cases to compare at the global and 
system levels because forests and fish stocks are governed in different ways. Whereas 
forests are national resources governed primarily by domestic authorities and private 
owners or companies with logging concessions, fish stocks are common-pool resources 
governed through multilateral, bilateral, and domestic management regimes. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I outline the research questions, provide 
a brief overview of extant literature on non-state global environmental governance, and 
present the object under investigation. The next section turns to the theoretical approach 
of the thesis. I examine two theoretical perspectives on the formation and effectiveness 
of non-state governance institutions and argue that insights from each of these 
perspectives can be combined in the analysis. This section is followed by the analytical 
framework of the dissertation. Based on the theoretical perspectives and empirically 
grounded work on non-state governance, I outline factors that are likely to influence the 
emergence and effectiveness of forest and fisheries certification schemes. In the closing 
section, I turn to the research design of the study and briefly review the cases under 
investigation.  
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1. Research questions and the object studied 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of an under-
explored area of contemporary environmental politics: the emergence and effectiveness 
of non-state institutions in the shape of voluntary certification and labeling schemes. In 
this section, I outline the research questions of the thesis, discuss how non-state 
governance schemes can be studied, and review the object under investigation.  
1.1 Research questions 
The overarching research questions in this thesis are fundamental to political science: 
How can we explain institutional formation? How do institutions influence behavior? 
Although we know a great deal about the rise and effectiveness of international regimes 
established by states, we still have limited knowledge about the formation and 
effectiveness of transnational governance schemes developed by non-state actors such 
as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industry associations. This study 
examines the following broad research questions related to institutional emergence and 
effectiveness: 
 
• How can we explain the emergence and spread of non-state certification schemes in 
the forestry and fisheries sectors? 
• How and to what extent does the organization of standard-setting processes 
influence standard-setting outcomes?  
• What are the causal mechanisms that link certification schemes and behavioral 
change; and when, and under what conditions, are these mechanisms likely to 
influence behavior? 
 
Institutional emergence: Forest and fisheries certification schemes have become vibrant 
and innovative venues for non-state rulemaking and governance. An examination of 
these certification schemes can help us to understand how non-state governance 
institutions evolve and spread, and why they increasingly supplement state-based, 
territorial government. I do not seek to identify all the factors that could influence non-
state institutional formation, but rather to uncover the processes and mechanisms of the 
emergence and proliferation of non-state governance schemes. An analytical focus on 
processes and mechanisms can enrich the extant literature on non-state governance and 
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private institutions, which is typically based on empirical narratives and single case 
studies rather than comparative case study research. It can also enrich the theoretical 
literature on global governance, which often lacks an empirical grounding in specific 
cases of non-state governance.   
 
Organizing standard-setting processes: Non-state certification schemes constitute 
governing arenas that regulate the access and interactions of participants. Constitutive 
rules that regulate access, participation, and decision making can be expected to 
influence standard-setting processes and the regulative rules (standards) being 
produced. I am interested in how constitutive rules regulating the access, participation, 
and decision-making rights of stakeholders such as environmental NGOs, industry 
associations, and social groups influence the unfolding of the standard-setting process 
and the outcome of that process. I am also interested in how non-state actors organize 
rulemaking and governance to create legitimacy for their actions and to enhance 
accountability. The organizational focus enables a careful analysis of the framing, 
operationalization, and transformation of accountability and legitimacy within and 
among certification schemes operating in the forestry and fisheries sectors. Finally, I am 
interested in the role of science in rule-setting processes. Scientific knowledge can be 
assumed to constitute a platform for negotiating and discussing standards. Without 
credible knowledge about the causes and consequences of the environmental problem at 
hand, standard setters would be hard put to create appropriate rules to address the 
problem. Stakeholders must also be convinced that the standards are reasonable, 
appropriate, and legitimate, and that they are based on the best available knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge could serve to justify why it is important to adopt standards and 
why target companies ought to comply. In one sense, standard setting is a way of 
translating complex knowledge to a set of explicit rules. On the other hand, standards 
cannot simply be derived from knowledge, and the process is likely to involve 
bargaining among different stakeholders. The focus on the organization of the science-
policy dialogue enables me to undertake an analysis of the influence of organizational 
form on the process of transforming knowledge to a set of concrete standards.  
 
Institutional effectiveness: Following the most common definition of regime 
effectiveness, institutions of environmental governance can be considered effective if 
they contribute to the alleviation or resolution of the specific problems they address 
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(e.g. Underdal 1992, 2002; Young and Levy 1999). A distinction should be made 
between the direct effects of an institution and other consequences flowing from regime 
formation efforts (Underdal 2002: 5). Whereas an investigation of the direct effects of 
an institution is the appropriate strategy for evaluating the institution itself, the other 
consequences flowing from regime formation efforts provide a basis for exploring the 
broader consequences of problem-solving efforts. In this study of non-state governance 
schemes, I am interested in narrow institutional effectiveness and in the broader 
consequences generated by problem-solving efforts. My ambition is not to determine if 
the problem at hand can be solved under present certification schemes, but rather to 
identify causal mechanisms that mediate between certification schemes and changes in 
problem-relevant behavior as well as the variables that influence problem-solving 
effectiveness. Specifying theoretically based and empirically grounded causal 
mechanisms is important for understanding the relationship between institutions and 
changes in problem-relevant behavior (Elster 1989; Young and Levy 1999). Detailed 
process tracing and case-study analysis of certification schemes can uncover when and 
under what conditions these mechanisms influence behavior. In addition, two broader 
regime consequences are in focus in this study: shifting alliances among stakeholders 
and public and private institutional interplay. First, we may expect that collaboration 
among NGOs, business, and other stakeholders in standard-setting projects may have 
effects over and beyond instrumental problem solving. Because there have traditionally 
been relatively high levels of conflict among environmentalists and business actors in 
the forestry and fisheries sectors, it is relevant to examine collaboration in non-state 
rulemaking projects to determine if it has resulted in conflict resolution, new cleavages, 
or shifting alliances among stakeholders. Second, there is likely to be interplay between 
public and private institutions governing natural resource use and protection. Because 
certification initiatives exist alongside existing international institutions and national 
laws and regulations, it is useful to discuss interaction effects between public and 
private rulemaking and governance. Public and private institutions can reinforce each 
others’ rules and enforcement capacities (positive interplay), but they may also disrupt 
or impede each others’ effectiveness (negative interplay). In this context, I am also 
interested in examining certification initiatives to see if they tend to supplement or 
supplant traditional public policy regulations.  
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1.2 Non-state global environmental governance 
In recent years, literature on global governance and multi-level governance has emerged 
in opposition to the state-centric ontology of traditional international relations 
theorizing. According to Rosenau (1995: 13), “global governance is conceived to 
include systems of rule at all level of human activity – from the family to the 
international organization – in which the pursuit of goals has transnational 
repercussions”. Global governance approaches are used to capture and understand the 
myriad networks and steering arrangements in world affairs in the absence of an 
overarching authority at the international level (e.g. Rosenau 1997, 2003). The concept 
of multi-level governance has been applied primarily to studies of European Union 
policy making and politics (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001). It also has relevance, 
however, for the study of non-state governance, in that it directs attention to the 
multiplicity of actors and networks engaged in policy making and enactment at different 
levels of authority and in various sectors (Bache and Flinders 2004). Multi-level and 
global-governance scholars have in common their assertion that, as a result of 
globalization, centralization, and supranational integration on the one hand and 
localization, regionalization, and fragmentation on the other, states must increasingly 
share rulemaking authority with subnational, transnational, and supranational actors.  
The global governance literature points to the alleged failure of international 
relations theory to capture adequately the effects of globalization and the increasing 
salience and impact of non-state actors such as NGOs, social movements, companies, 
and the media in world affairs. One of the key claims in this literature is that 
government must be studied as a process rather than as an institution (Rosenau and 
Czempiel, 1992). Studies of global governance typically focus on nonhierarchical, 
network-based modes of governing in which a range of actors are involved. 
Consequently, we should look beyond intergovernmental regimes to identify the central 
governance arenas and the key actors in a transnationalizing world. According to global 
governance scholars, we are witnessing a shift from government to governance, 
characterized by privatization, state transformation, shared public and private authority, 
and non-state rule-setting supplementing or even supplanting traditional command-and-
control regulation (Rosenau, 1997, 2003; Rhodes 1996, 1997; Pierre, 2000). Sometimes 
referred to as “governance without government” (e.g. Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; 
Rhodes, 1996), this development implies a less central role for the state and increased 
influence for non-state actors.  
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A growing literature has explored the explosion of transnational advocacy 
coalitions around the world, showing that activism was limited in the past to the 
domestic arena, but that activists today organize across national boundaries, bringing 
together stakeholders in a number of countries to put pressure on companies or govern-
ments (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995; Wapner 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). More specifically, several recent studies have examined the 
emergence of non-state institutions in world politics, including various forms of 
“private authority” (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Haufler 2001; Hall and Biersteker 
2002) and transnational rule-setting arrangements (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). 
Seeking to conceptualize the changing patterns of governance in international affairs, 
scholars have noted the increasing importance of private authorities as a trend 
characterized by what they have come to call the “privatization of governance” (Cutler, 
Haufler, and Porter 1999) and the spread of “non-state market-driven” governance 
systems that depend on market support for their rulemaking authority (Cashore 2002). 
In this literature, non-state governance systems are seen as emerging in response 
to globalization processes and transboundary environmental problems that states have 
been unable or unwilling to resolve themselves. Today there are myriad steering and 
governance arrangements at different levels of authority that seek to influence company 
conduct. Many of these arrangements have been created with little or no involvement of 
states or traditional international organizations like the UN or the World Bank. Indeed, 
several transnational governance schemes have been created in response to failure of 
states to resolve pressing transboundary environmental problems. In the apparel 
products field, for example, NGOs created labor standard certification schemes to 
address sweatshop labor practices, child labor, and other human rights violations 
(Bartley 2005). For other issues, such as trading in coffee, cocoa, and bananas, NGOs 
have taken the initiative to create fair-trade labeling schemes to guarantee producers in 
developing countries a fair minimum price for their products and to improve their 
working conditions.  
A distinct literature on “ecological modernization” focuses on the changing role 
of the state, science and technology, the market, and civil society in response to the 
“ecological crisis” and the inadequacy of traditional state intervention (e.g. Spaargaren 
and Mol 1992; Mol 1996; Mol, Lauber, and Liefferink 2000). Hajer (1995) sees 
ecological modernization as the new dominant discourse about environmental problems. 
Unlike earlier antagonistic debates among environmental activists, governments, and 
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industry, the ecological modernization literature views environmental problems as 
possible to anticipate, calculate, and resolve through scientific and technological 
advances and collaborative solutions among industries, states, and civil society. The 
communicative and interactive approach to policy-making is said to transform the major 
institutions of modern society – science and technology, the market, and the state. It 
means that a broad range of actors engages in politics – often in coalitions located 
outside traditional channels of influence – and that the state assumes a new role, 
steering at a distance and facilitating collaboration rather than commanding change.  
In this context, processes of standardization could be seen as a new and 
collaborative way of policy making, corresponding to the environmental modernization 
discourse (Boström 2003a). The emergence of voluntary codes of conduct, standards, 
and agreements is part of a general shift from command and control instruments and 
“end of pipe” regulations toward process-oriented, collaborative solutions among 
environmental organizations, industry, and the state. This shift is seen as a result of the 
inability of traditional state regulations to deal effectively with diffuse, transboundary, 
and complex environmental problems, as well as the ideological favoring of market-
based solutions in modern society (Hajer 1995; Mol 1996; Mol, Lauber, and Liefferink 
2000). Economic, market-based, and flexible instruments are claimed to be more 
effective at stimulating technological innovation and internalization of environmental 
costs than traditional regulations are. Although the activities of companies have resulted 
in a wide range of environmental problems, such as climate change, ozone depletion, 
deforestation, and over-fishing, companies are increasingly seen as part of the solution 
to these problems. Similarly, in the new climate of voluntary policy making, 
environmental organizations assume new roles through strategic engagement with 
companies and industry associations (Boström 2003a). Many environmental 
organizations have searched for new ways to influence corporate conduct and, as a 
result, have cooperated with businesses to set voluntary standards and develop 
mechanisms to enforce them.  
What, then, are the theories and analytical tools that can guide us in the study of 
non-state governance schemes? Although it is possible to specify the core analytical 
claims in the ecological modernization and global governance literature, the 
implications for studying the formation and effectiveness of non-state governance 
schemes remain elusive. To be sure, the theoretical and empirical work on advocacy 
networks, private authorities, and public-private partnerships provides a number of 
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valuable insights, to which I return in the analytical framework. There is, however, no 
coherent theory of multi-level or global governance that could be used to provide an 
adequate prediction or explanation for when and under what conditions non-state 
governance institutions are likely to emerge and influence behavior in their specific 
domains. The global governance literature has been criticized for neglecting the role of 
power in the governing process (Barnett and Duvall 2005) and for failing to provide the 
analytical tools needed to grasp the content of the governance process (Sending and 
Neumann 2006). Perhaps more important in the context of addressing my research 
questions, this literature has been said to be “incapable of providing clear predictions or 
even explanations (other than the most general) of outcomes in the governing process” 
(Peters and Pierre 2004: 88). In short, the global governance literature provides neither a 
theory that could help generate nontrivial propositions about non-state institutional 
formation and consequences nor the analytical tools to explain governance outcomes.  
The assumption that states are the key actors in world politics and the focus on 
institution building and effects separate the literature on international regimes from the 
literature on multi-level governance and global governance. The regime literature 
arguably provides the most comprehensive and advanced accounts of institutional 
formation and consequences in international relations. Cutler and colleagues (1999: 14) 
claim that whereas the regime literature has remained “stubbornly state centric” in its 
conceptual and empirical focus, “the definition itself, and its utility in explaining certain 
forms of cooperation, does not require the relevant actors to be states”. Although this 
literature typically focuses on states and their interactions in international regimes 
created and dominated by states, there are several similarities between regimes 
established by states and private regimes or governance schemes established by non-
state actors. Being issue-specific within clear spatial and functional boundaries and with 
authority to enforce or facilitate compliance in their specific concerns, both public and 
private regimes seek to influence the behavior of their members. In essence, 
mainstream, rationalist regime theory is a theory about voluntary collaboration among 
actors to create mutually beneficial institutional arrangements in order to achieve some 
common goals.1 
                                                 
1 The assumptions about voluntary and mutually beneficial cooperation are based on the rationalist or 
interest-based strand of regime theory. According to power-based (realist) regime theory, regime 
formation may involve hegemonic coercion and struggles to obtain relative gains rather than absolute 
gains (see e.g. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997: Chapter 4). 
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The attractiveness of applying insights from rationalist regime theory to 
analyzing non-state governance lies, in particular, in its focus on issue specificity, 
institutional formation, causal consequences, and problem-solving capacity (Stokke 
1997; Young and Levy 1999; Miles et al. 2002). In light of the criticism directed at the 
global governance literature, there are good reasons for taking regime theory as a point 
of departure for exploring the mechanisms and pathways that could explain institutional 
formation and effectiveness. Given the focus on institutions in this thesis, sociological 
institutionalism is another rich and influential theoretical approach that I draw upon in 
the analytical framework. Insights from sociological institutionalism have influenced 
constructivist accounts of international regimes and international organizations (e.g. 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism 
are reviewed and discussed in the next section, but I first take a closer look at the object 
under investigation. 
1.3 The object studied: Fisheries and forest certification 
Despite increasing concern over deforestation in the tropics and global forest 
degradation, states have failed to agree on a legally binding global agreement for the 
protection and sustainable use of forests. Forest certification was introduced by 
environmental NGOs to ameliorate environmental degradation in forestry, caused by 
intensive commercial exploitation and practices such as the logging of old-growth 
forests and clear cutting of large areas. By the late 1980s, NGOs had become frustrated 
with the failure of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) to promote 
tropical forest protection. The refusal of the ITTO to establish a labeling system for 
tropical timber from sustainably managed sources convinced the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) that such a system had to be developed by private initiative (Humphreys 
1996: 72–75). Their conviction gained strength during the preparatory process for the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janeiro, given the lack of support that was shown for the aspiration to negotiate a 
legally binding forest convention.  
In 1993, primarily at the initiative of the WWF, the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) was officially founded as the first global forest certification scheme by 
environmental organizations, timber traders, indigenous peoples’ groups, forest worker 
organizations, and other stakeholders. The FSC was formed to promote sustainable 
forest practices and to encourage retailers and consumers to support such practices by 
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buying certified forest products. More precisely, the FSC developed principles and 
criteria for its definition of “well-managed forests”, including tenure and use rights and 
responsibilities, indigenous peoples’ and workers’ rights, use of forest products and 
services to maximize economic viability and environmental and social benefits, 
maintenance of forests with high conservation value, environmental impact, monitoring 
and assessment, and planning and management of plantations.2 These principles and 
criteria are elaborated upon and specified for each country or region in national or 
regional FSC working groups, through a process in which ecological, economic, and 
social stakeholders have, in principle, equal decision-making powers. Because FSC 
arose in opposition to intergovernmental cooperation on forests, its principles and 
criteria are not linked to any internationally agreed-upon forest policy 
recommendations. Unlike many standard development processes in which governments 
are involved, FSC rules explicitly prohibit the participation of government 
representatives in the organization. FSC’s international board approves national, 
regional, or landowner-specific standards consistent with the scheme’s principles, 
criteria, and procedural rules. Another essential ingredient is the opportunity provided 
by the scheme to track the origin of products through every stage of the supply chain – 
frequently referred to as the “chain of custody”. Such chain-of-custody tracking ensures 
purchasers and consumers that labeled forest products really originate from certified 
forests.  
The national forestry interest organizations and landowner associations of 
several countries responded to the creation of FSC by establishing producer-dominated 
certification schemes. The FSC and its supporters succeeded in creating demand for 
certification, but many forest companies and forest owners distrusted the scheme 
because it was initiated and promoted by WWF and other environmental organizations. 
Equally important, forestry stakeholders disliked its environmental and social standards, 
which they considered to be stringent and which they claimed were applied with 
inflexibility. Thus forest industry and landowner associations in Europe, the United 
States, Canada, and elsewhere were motivated to establish schemes with less stringent 
environmental and social standards.  
Meanwhile, inspired by the establishment of the FSC for the forestry sector, the 
WWF exported the certification and labeling idea to the fisheries sector. In 1996, the 
                                                 
2 FSC originally had nine principles; the tenth, on plantations, was added in 1996. 
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WWF teamed up with Unilever, one of the world’s largest purchasers of fish, to 
establish the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) as a marked-based certification and 
labeling scheme for fish and fish products. Breaking free of its parent organizations to 
consolidate its independence, MSC was established in 1999 as a fully independent 
nonprofit organization. Although several single-claim schemes such as “dolphin-safe” 
tuna and “turtle safe” shrimp already existed for seafood labeling, MSC was the first 
global multi-criteria certification and labeling scheme for marine fisheries. It established 
global principles and criteria for its definition of “well-managed fisheries”. The three 
main principles of the MSC require (1) that wild-caught fisheries do not conduct 
operations that lead to overfishing or depletion of exploited populations or that they 
hinder the rebuilding of depleted populations; (2) that they maintain the structure, 
productivity, and diversity of the ecosystem on which the fishery depend; and (3) that 
they have an effective management system in place and comply with local, national, and 
international fishery laws and standards. These principles are supplemented by a 
number of more specific operational and management criteria as well as scoring 
indicators developed for each fishery undergoing certification. The idea is the same as 
in forest certification: Professional purchasers and consumers may support sustainable 
management practices by buying products carrying a label indicating that they are 
sourced from sustainably managed natural resources. As with FSC, the MSC labeling 
requires chain-of-custody tracking to ensure that products carrying its logo actually 
originate in a certified fishery. Unlike the FSC, however, the MSC has not yet been 
challenged by competing certification schemes. 
To summarize, by circumventing international forest policy negotiations, forest 
certification potentially offers an alternative, fast-track route to sustainable forest 
management around the world. Whereas MSC certification builds on international 
fisheries agreements, it also seeks to offer environmentally concerned companies, 
retailers, and consumers an effective tool to promote more stringent environmental rules 
and more effective enforcement mechanisms than those created by governments.  
 
2. Theoretical perspectives 
Although the focus of this thesis is on non-state governance schemes, I share a research 
interest in exploring institutional formation and effectiveness with students of 
international regimes established by states. The thesis thus draws on two well-
  13 
established theoretical perspectives in the social sciences: rational institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism. Although these perspectives are sometimes said to be 
incompatible in terms of ontological and epistemological premises, I argue that insights 
from rational and sociological institutionalism can be combined to examine and 
understand institutional formation and consequences. To draw upon insights from these 
theoretical traditions resonates well with recent efforts to bridge the gap between the 
rationalist and constructivist literatures on international relations (e.g. Adler 1997; 
Checkel 1997, 2007; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; 
Fearon and Wendt 2002), and to draw upon sociological institutionalism in the study of 
international organizations (Finnemore 1996; Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004). 
Indeed, accounts of international regime formation and effectiveness often draw on 
insights from both rational and sociological institutionalism (Stokke 1997; Young 1999; 
Young and Levy 1999), as could accounts of non-state regimes or governance schemes.  
2.1 Rational institutionalism 
Given the focus on transnational institutions in this thesis, the rationalist strand of 
regime theory stands out as one particularly useful approach for examining institutional 
formation and institutional effects. To be sure, there are several theoretical approaches 
within regime theory that are not dissimilar to broader theoretical approaches within the 
field of international relations theory. For instance, Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 
(1997) argue that one can differentiate among interest-based, power-based, and 
knowledge-based theories of international regimes. For the purpose of clarity, however, 
I am drawing on insights from the mainstream interest-based or rationalist strand of 
regime theory in this section in order to explore non-state regime formation and 
consequences. Whereas state-centric, power-based (realist) accounts of international 
regime formation and effectiveness seem less relevant for the study of non-state 
regimes, I return to some of the insights from knowledge-based (constructivist) regime 
theory in the next section on sociological institutionalism.  
Partly because of the different approaches taken to study regimes, there is some 
disagreement over how to define and delineate regimes (see e.g. Young 1986; Levy, 
Young, and Zürn 1995). The most commonly cited definition is probably Krasner’s 
(1982: 186) specification of regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations”. International environmental regimes typically 
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include a core treaty, such as a framework convention, supplemented by one or several 
protocols, although they may also be based on “soft law” agreements (Levy, Young, 
and Zürn 1995: 274). Prototypical examples of international environmental regimes 
include the ozone layer protection regime, based upon the Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer (1985) and upon the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete 
the Ozone Layer (1987); and the climate change regime, based upon the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997).  
Do international regimes such as these have independent causal effects, or do 
they merely reflect underlying power and interest structures or pre-institutional social 
orders? From the perspective of structural realism, regimes are seen as epiphenomena 
that mirror and never change the fundamental configurations of power and interests in 
world politics (Strange 1982; Mearsheimer 1995). According to Waltz (1979), we must 
distinguish between institutions and what he calls ordering principles; the ordering 
principle of an anarchical international system means that the only international 
institutions that can be built and sustained are those based on consensual cooperation or 
hegemonic coercion.  
In response to the relatively pessimistic implications of structural realism, 
regime theorists have set out to demonstrate that institutions have causal autonomy and 
that they are not merely a reflection of configurations of power and interests in world 
politics. One of the main claims of the interest-based perspective is that regimes may 
change the utility that actors assign to behavioral options within an issue area. Unlike 
structural realists, regime analysts claim that once established, regimes may have 
significant behavioral consequences for their members – independent of underlying 
power structures. For example, an effective regime may reduce the risk of unilateral 
defection by increasing the costs of breaching certain principles, norms, and rules, 
and/or by increasing the benefits of complying. More generally, regime theorists argue 
that because regimes enhance reciprocity, reduce barriers to mutually beneficial 
collaboration, and are resilient to changes in the configurations of interests and power 
structures among states, they cannot be dismissed as epiphenomena in international 
relations (e.g. Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Young and Osherenko 1993; Haas, Kehoane, 
and Levy 1993). 
Regime theorists in the rationalist tradition treat state interests as exogenously 
given. Many analysts conceive of states as unitary rational actors, although some also 
look at the influence of domestic interest groups. In an international society 
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characterized by “complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1977), states have 
mutual interests in a variety of issue areas such as security, energy policies, policing, 
trade, monetary policies, sustainable resource management, and the environment. 
Efforts to provide a public good (a good that cannot be de denied to anyone once it is 
provided) through collective action always involve the risk of free riding by actors who 
do not share the costs of obtaining the good, but reap the benefits (Olson 1965). 
According to Olson (1965), if there were no penalties for failing to contribute to the 
realization of the public good, it would not be in the self-interest of rational, utility-
maximizing actors to contribute to its realization, even though all actors would benefit 
from it.  
Although international relations are beset with collective action problems, the 
relatively small number of states in the world decreases problems with collective action 
and enhances the likely success of collaboration (Keohane 1984: 77). Keohane’s 
functional or contractualist theory of international regimes explains regime formations 
as, inter alia, efforts to resolve collective action problems and provide mutual goods by 
enhancing reciprocity and certainty about future interactions and reducing transaction 
costs and other barriers to mutually beneficial collaboration (Keohane 1984, 1989, 
1993). Using game theory, Axelrod (1984) has demonstrated that collaboration among 
utility-maximizing actors can emerge as a result of repeated interactions over time. And, 
opposing Olson’s (1965) relatively pessimistic view on collective action, Ostrom (1990) 
has argued that common-pool resources, such as inshore fisheries and communal 
forests, can be managed by common property regimes if they are properly designed. 
One may expect that non-state actors, like states, agree on coordination 
standards to resolve coordination problems, decrease uncertainty, and reduce 
transaction costs. For standards organizations to form in the first place, actors must 
perceive that coordination will serve their interests and that the achievement of any 
benefit (whether individual or collective) is contingent upon mutual action. Producers, 
firms, and other market actors could therefore be expected to contribute to institutional 
formation and participate in those institutions to increase utility. In business 
coordination situations, in which actors are indifferent about where to coordinate 
behavior, all actors profit from collaboration and nobody profits from defection. Once 
established, an industry code of conduct or standard may be adopted by all companies 
and could in one sense be regarded as a collective good for the industry. Examples of 
coordination standards are international aviation safety standards like those established 
 16 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), rules pertaining to the use of 
sea lanes created by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or global 
communication standards like those established by the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). As long as actors are indifferent about where 
to coordinate and are able to communicate, agreeing on such standards is relatively easy 
(cf. Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Snidal 1985; Young 1999). 
There is, however, a fundamental difference between business coordination 
standards and performance-based environmental standards like those in forestry and 
fisheries. Although there are situations in which all companies can benefit from 
coordinating their behavior and creating common standards, performance-based 
standards and certification schemes require companies to undertake costly behavioral 
changes that they otherwise would not be required to implement (Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom, 2004). Why, then, do profit-maximizing companies create performance-based 
standards and adopt such standards on a voluntary basis? Because environmental and 
social reputations may reflect on the industry as a whole – not merely on individual 
firms (Gunningham and Rees 1997) – industry associations often develop industry 
standards or codes of conduct in order to demonstrate the high level of responsibility 
they assume for their operations, to protect the reputation of their industry, and to 
provide credible information to consumers (cf. Klein 1997; Spar 1998). The collective 
action problem is reduced by the fact that companies often participate in industry 
associations and are able to monitor each other’s behavior. An industry response of this 
kind occurred when the US chemical industry developed the Responsible Care code-of-
conduct following the 1984 Bhopal Disaster in India, in which the accidental release of 
40 tonnes of toxic gas from a pesticide plant owned by the US company Union Carbide 
killed several thousand people.  
Other scholars hold that companies often create or adopt voluntary standards in 
the hope of preventing enactment of more demanding public policy regulations (e.g. 
Clapp 2005: 224). Yet another possibility is that their managers want to prepare for and 
take advantage of anticipated public policy regulations. Either way, companies 
contribute to institutional formation in order to maximize utility and manage the risks 
and costs of doing business in the global marketplace. 
The question then becomes: How do institutions produce effects? Regime 
theorists have tried to answer this question by tracing processes that mediate between 
the institutions and particular outcomes (Stokke 1997; Young and Levy 1999). Such 
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process tracing is often guided by the specification of one or more causal mechanisms 
that are believed to link institutions and behavioral change. Whether we study 
international regimes established by states or non-state institutions for environmental 
governance, our task would then be to specify the ways in which the institutions may 
contribute to problem-solving behavioral adaptations. According to interest-based 
regime theory, the principle function of international regimes is to restructure incentives 
by increasing the benefits of participation and compliance with rules and by adding 
costs to defection (Barrett 2003). Similarly, certification and labeling schemes may 
influence the cost-benefit calculations of utility-maximizing companies by creating 
opportunities to profit from market demand for products flowing from sustainable 
resource-management practices. Interest may be exhibited within well-positioned 
companies for joining a labeling program in order to obtain a competitive advantage in 
the form of a “green” label. For example, a company that has already implemented 
stringent environmental standards may be interested in developing a scheme that would 
allow its products to carry a label signaling responsibility and high environmental 
performance. Other companies may see new business opportunities in niche markets 
through participation in certification and labeling schemes. And some companies may 
choose to participate in such schemes in order to uphold their market access in 
environmentally concerned markets.  
In any case, the causal logic is that certification standards will require applicants 
to modify their practices to become eligible to participate in the scheme. If certification 
bodies approve management practices and performance levels, applicants will be 
certified and, in most systems, will have an opportunity to label their products. The 
label itself will identify products that flow from sustainably managed resources, thus 
permitting retailers and other professional purchasers to signal attitudes that could 
distinguish them from other, similar purchasers. Similarly, individual consumers may 
signal a preference for sustainable management practices by choosing labeled rather 
than unlabeled products. To the extent that greater market access or price premiums 
would flow from this process, other producers will find the option of joining more 
attractive, resulting in further diffusion of sustainable management practices. 
Turning now to compliance with rules, the interest-based strand of regime 
theory, argues that states – as rational, unitary actors – may and often do act within the 
constraints of rules for reasons of material self-interest and utility. We assume that 
companies may also choose to comply with voluntary standards based upon rational-
 18 
calculative decisions because compliance is expected to reduce costs or generate net 
benefits in the long term. We expect that effective non-state standards institutions, 
similar to regimes established by states, restructure incentives by increasing the benefits 
of compliance with standards and penalizing noncompliance and defection. In short, the 
principal function of standards organizations is to create rules and governance 
arrangements that contribute to a realignment of incentives governing resource 
management and use.  
Again, this function will not be important in pure coordination games, but will 
be essential in cooperation games (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997: 45-53). As 
indicated earlier, once coordination rules or standards have been established, actors 
would have no incentive for cheating (Young 1999: 27). The type of standards we are 
interested in here, however, is of a different kind; a purely utility-maximizing actor 
could benefit from adopting these standards and not complying with them, given that 
noncompliance is not detected or does not have negative consequences (Young 1999; 
see also Snidal 1985). Because compliance with performance-based standards like those 
for fisheries and forest certification typically requires (costly) behavioral changes, 
companies could benefit from adopting the standards but not complying with them. It 
must be possible to detect noncompliance, therefore, and compliance must be enforced. 
The principal tool for monitoring and enforcing compliance in certification schemes is 
regular third-party auditing of practices. Companies that comply with the certification 
standards are rewarded with a certificate that attests to sustainable management 
practices. Companies that do not comply with standards risk the penalty of having their 
certificate suspended.  
In the literature on international environmental regimes, a distinction is 
sometimes made between the enforcement approach and the management approach to 
compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1995). Proponents of the management approach to 
compliance argue that information sharing, technical and financial assistance, 
implementation support, systems of implementation review, and the like will be just as 
effective in eliciting compliance as strict enforcement of rules will be (ibid.). We may 
expect that such capacity building could facilitate compliance with non-state standards 
as well, but capacity building is normally not a task for non-state institutions with 
limited financial and material resources. Without the support of governments, there are 
limited possibilities for non-state institutions to apply the management approach to 
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compliance. From the perspective of rational institutionalism, therefore, compliance 
with non-state standards must, in principle, be monitored and enforced.  
2.2 Sociological institutionalism 
From the perspective of sociological institutionalism, institutionalized norms in the 
environments of organizations define appropriate and inappropriate behavior, prescribe 
and proscribe courses of action, and legitimate particular organizational forms (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991; Scott 2001).3 Organizations adopt 
a certain language and certain procedures because the actions of an entity must be 
acceptable or appropriate within a certain institutional framework. In early 
neoinstitutional work, organizations are said to reflect – and never to transform – 
institutionalized norms and values in the environments and systems in which they are 
situated. According to sociologists Meyer and Rowan (1977), formal organizations 
derive their form and function from institutionalized social orders. The adoption of 
certain formal structures is seen to be the result of the traveling and spread of 
rationalized myths. Myths are widely held belief systems and cultural frames that are 
imposed upon or adopted by organizations. They are rationalized because they prescribe 
certain ways of organizing and proscribe other ways of organizing to accomplish a 
given end. Organizations adopt rationalized myths and must reflect institutionalized 
social orders in order to be granted legitimacy from salient constituencies in their 
environments (ibid).  
The effect of rationalized myths on institutional formation is organizational 
imitation and convergence. Organizations derive their form, not from instrumental 
efficiency, but rather from institutionalized norms and values in the environments in 
which they are situated. Because organizations are reflections of rather than creators of 
underlying structures, there are no autonomous causal effects from the organizations. In 
this perspective, the formal organization may be crucial for legitimizing behavior, but 
does little to change the rules of the game and underlying social orders. Similarly, 
constructivist regime theorists stress that international regimes are embedded in and 
molded by broader normative contexts (e.g. Ruggie 1983; Kratochwil and Ruggie 
1986). According to this view, regimes are not so much creators of international norms 
and practices as they are reflections of underlying normative structures and social orders 
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(Stokke 1997). Strong versions of this argument hold that underlying normative 
structures are fully determinate of regime design and social practices, whereas more 
moderate versions hold that normative structures are important sources of 
legitimization, but not full determinants of formal structure. In the latter view, there is 
room for both agency and transformation of underlying social orders. According to 
Conca (2006: 69):  
 
If the normative order of international relations is powerful without being fully 
determinate – authoritative but not hegemonic – then specific struggles to craft the 
rules, norms, and institutions of global environmental governance could yield 
institutional forms other than the statist, territorialized, functional-rational institutional 
form. Studying these struggles may shed light on whether a richer array of institutional 
forms than we can imagine exist in practice. 
 
Sociological institutionalists subscribing to the notion of powerful and fully determinate 
institutional environments have long struggled with explaining institutional change. If 
organizations merely reflect deeper layers of social orders or configurations of power 
and interest, how can we explain why and how institutions emerge, evolve, and 
sometimes die? Part of the answer is given by organizational field-level analyses (e.g. 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; DiMaggio 1991), which shows that even though 
institutional environments are important, organizations can themselves be agents of 
change and transform the fields in which they are situated. Institutional theorists have 
developed the concept of organizational field to isolate for analysis “a collection of 
interdependent organizations operating with common rules, norms, and meaning 
systems” (Scott 2003: 130). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 148), an 
organizational field comprises “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life”. Highly institutionalized fields are characterized by 
sets of rules and practices that are taken for granted. The character of an organization’s 
embeddedness in a field shapes the organizational arrangements, procedures, and 
strategies that are perceived to be legitimate. As explained by Scott (2003: 130) in field-
level analyses, “organizations are treated as members of larger, overarching systems 
exhibiting, to varying degrees, structure and coherence”. 
                                                                                                                                               
3 The sociological literature on institutions is, like the rationalist literature, both rich and varied. In this 
section, I review only some of the most important contributions to this literature.  
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Organizations in a specific field may not be linked by direct interactions, but 
they operate in the same realm and under similar conditions and therefore exhibit 
similar structural characteristics (Scott 2003: 130). Unlike the notion of relatively fixed 
institutional environments, a field-level perspective allows us to observe not only the 
influence of common norms, rules, and meaning systems, but also the disappearance of 
some organizational types and the emergence of new forms. Whereas early 
neoinstitutional work tended to see organizations as adapting rather passively to 
rationalized myths, more recent work has demonstrated that organizations adapt and 
transform myths and innovate to create institutional change (e.g. Sahlin-Andersson 
1996; Hoffman 1999; Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 
2002). 
A sociological account of regime formation would contend that specific 
organizational carriers are agents of institutional change in organizational fields. 
International organizations, NGOs, business consultants, and activists are said to 
constitute networks with a certain culture and significant influence on the formation, 
transformation, and flow of organizational ideas (e.g. Boli and Thomas 1999; Djelic and 
Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Drori, Meyer, and Hwang 2006). For example, the FSC was 
established primarily at the initiative of WWF, which also exported the FSC 
certification model to the fisheries sector by creating the MSC. Whereas rational 
institutionalism sees regime formation as a functional solution to (environmental) 
problems in specific sectors, sociological institutionalism highlights the influence of 
organizational carriers who promote particular organizational recipes that are consistent 
with salient norm and values in the institutional environment. In a sense, the spread of 
the certification model could be seen as resulting from a solution in search of a problem 
(March and Olsen 1976) rather than a functional response to particular problems (Auld 
et al. 2007). The success of an organization is judged from its ability to adapt to popular 
organizational ideas and recipes, which, in turn, are legitimized by institutionalized 
norms and values. Consequently, a successful recipe can be expected to be consistent 
and aligned with salient norms and values in an organizational field. Popular 
organizational recipes may or may not enhance instrumental problem solving, but as 
long as the organization adopts those recipes, it is deemed successful by field-level 
audiences. 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), homogenization within 
organizational fields may occur as a result of three processes: coercive isomorphism, 
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mimetic processes, and normative pressures. Coercive isomorphism may result from 
government regulations, but it could also result from preferences for particular 
organizational forms from donors, charities, or other funding bodies. Mimetic processes 
occur when a number of organizations imitate a specific organizational model that is 
considered particularly legitimate or successful. Organizational models may be 
promoted by carriers like environmental NGOs, consulting firms, management gurus, or 
industry trade organizations. Normative pressures occur as professionals, educated in 
the same schools or university systems, occupy similar positions across a range of 
organizations, and introduce their occupational principles, norms, and values in those 
organizations. Although all these processes may be at play in non-state institutional 
formation and design, I expect that mimetic processes will be particularly important as a 
result of the influence of a global culture comprising broad consensus on the set of 
appropriate organizational forms (Meyer et al. 1997) and the actions of organizational 
carriers like the WWF and other advocacy groups. Environmental NGOs advocate the 
adoption of specific organizational recipes by praising or damning industry practices, 
mobilizing consumers, and convincing companies about the benefits of adopting those 
recipes. 
The spread of the certification model could rewrite the rules of organizations for 
doing business in a more fundamental way than by restructuring incentives. It may be 
decided that the organization will participate in certification schemes, because 
certification is associated with the identity of a modern organization, because it is seen 
as fashionable, or because it is considered to be a preeminent way of meeting 
expectations about appropriate conduct from relevant audiences. A particular 
certification scheme may acquire a high level of legitimacy within a sector, in the sense 
that participation is considered to be the right and appropriate thing to do. To use labels 
coined by March and Olsen (1989), they follow the “logic of appropriateness” rather 
than the utilitarian “logic of consequences”. Company leaders may also simply go with 
the flow and do what many other companies do; instead of calculating the costs and 
benefits of participation, it may be taken for granted that they ought to participate 
because other companies are participating. Yet another possibility is that there is no 
clear idea within the company about the consequences of their participation. Returning 
again to insights from regime theory, Young (1989) argues that what he calls “a veil of 
uncertainty” facilitates “institutional bargaining” in processes of international regime 
formation. His argument is that decision makers’ uncertainty about what is in their best 
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interest and about the future consequences of institutional arrangements enables states 
to form and participate in regimes. Similarly, uncertainty about the consequences of 
non-state governance schemes could enable agreement on institutional arrangements 
among the various stakeholders and facilitate producer participation.  
Turning to institutional consequences, a key expectation from sociological 
institutionalism is that, through their participation in non-state governance schemes, 
producers may internalize norms and rules about appropriate conduct in particular roles 
and situations. From this perspective, social learning and internalization of norms and 
rules constitute the prime causal mechanism believed to connect non-state governance 
schemes to behavioral change. Thus actors learn and accept the norms and rules of the 
scheme, and then use them to guide their behavior without having to reflect upon them. 
March and Olsen (1989: 23) depict behavior as being rule-driven: “to describe behavior 
as driven by rules is to see action as a matching of a situation to the demands of a 
position”. Instead of examining their individual goals and calculating the costs and 
benefits of behavioral options, then, actors try to match specific situations with the 
specific role called upon in this situation and the appropriate action as an occupant of 
that role. Rules of appropriateness are defined by political and social institutions and 
transmitted through socialization (March and Olsen 1989: 23). According to this view, 
institutions influence behavior, but in a different way than we would expect from an 
interest-based perspective. 
The assumption that actors follow the logic of appropriateness and not the logic 
of consequences has important implications for expectations about compliance with 
certification standards. Whereas rewards for compliance and sanctions for 
noncompliance are seen as crucial from the rational institutionalism perspective, 
sociological institutionalists would expect companies to comply with certification rules 
because of learning processes, internalization of rules, and habit. As a result, the process 
of developing and learning rules becomes more important than compliance verification 
and enforcement. Stakeholders that consider standards and rules as legitimate are more 
likely to comply with them than are those that believe the standards are unfair, 
inequitable, or unjustified. Like legal rules in international society, legitimate standards 
can exert an autonomous binding force and a “compliance pull” of their own (cf. Franck 
1990). According to this perspective, we expect that third-party auditing of practices is 
still important, but it is seen as a process whereby resource managers learn and accept 
rules, and then use them to guide their behavior – rather than as an instrument primarily 
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geared toward the enforcement of compliance. Problems with cheating and free riding 
do not loom large if stakeholders believe that the standards have emerged from a 
legitimate and fair process (Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn 2006). In a sense, actors feel 
compelled to comply with standards that are considered legitimate, even in cases where 
noncompliance would not be detected or would not have negative consequences.  
Beyond the expectations generated from each of the two theoretical 
perspectives, there is likely to be some type of interplay between the internalization of 
norms and rules and strategic-calculative decisions about participation in certification 
schemes and compliance with rules. The principles, norms, rules, and governance 
arrangements of non-state institutions could result in a realignment or redefinition of 
company interests and the boundaries of acceptable and appropriate behavior. A 
company’s decision makers may simply take for granted that they ought to participate in 
a certification scheme in order to obtain a societal license to operate. But they could still 
adapt strategically to a new reality by choosing to sign up for a less demanding scheme 
rather than a more stringent scheme. Another possibility is that resource managers in 
companies that joined certification schemes because of strategic calculative decisions 
learn and internalize certain environmental protection norms and rules. As a result, they 
will comply with those norms and rules habitually, without case-by-case deliberations 
about the costs and benefits of compliance (cf. Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn 2006: 155). 
The analysis must be sensitive to such interaction effects between the factors that 
influence institutional formation and effectiveness.  
Evaluations about the legitimacy of certification schemes and strategic-
calculative evaluations about participation are also likely to be interconnected. If the 
legitimacy of a certification scheme is widely questioned because of considerations 
about issues like equity, fairness, and distributive aspects, nonparticipation can be more 
easily justified and can therefore be less costly for companies. Questions and concerns 
about the legitimacy of a particular certification scheme could also be part of a strategy 
for creating support for a competing scheme with different standards. The proliferation 
of competing schemes could, in turn, result in new struggles for achieving rulemaking 
legitimacy and support from a wide range of constituents (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004). Moreover, any certification scheme depends on trust and moral support from 
consumers or other key actors in the marketplace. If certain salient audiences did not see 
a certification scheme as being legitimate and credible, there would be neither economic 
incentives nor normative pressures for companies to join the scheme. 
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2.3 Summary 
This discussion has pointed to various causal mechanism and pathways that could 
mediate between institutions and behavioral outcomes. A focus on causal mechanisms 
may help the analyst organize process tracing within cases and reveal the branching 
points and chain of events that resulted in specific outcomes (George and Bennett 
2005). Two such general mechanisms have been identified. (1) According to interest-
based regime theory, institutions influence behavior by restructuring incentives; they 
create incentives for compliance and increase the costs of noncompliance. Standard 
setters offer target companies such rewards as enhanced reputation or greater market 
access, on the condition that the company adopts and complies with the standards. 
Behavioral adaptation in line with the standards is more likely to occur when actors 
expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance. (2) According 
to sociological institutionalism, institutions influence perceptions about acceptable or 
appropriate behavior within an issue area; they create a sense of obligation to follow 
rules and commitments. Behavioral adaptation in line with the standards is more likely 
to occur when actors consider rule following as the appropriate and “right thing to do”. 
These mechanisms are supplementary rather than mutually exclusive; the question is 
when, and under what conditions, each of them is likely to come into play in non-state 
standard-setting processes. Having identified general causal mechanisms, I now turn to 
the key factors that are likely to influence the emergence and effectiveness of non-state 
governance institutions. 
 
3. Analytical approach 
Drawing on extant work on “private authorities”, non-state governance, and the 
organization of certification projects, this section investigates when, and under what 
conditions, non-state governance schemes are likely to emerge and influence the 
behavior of target groups. Corresponding to the broad research questions introduced 
earlier, I outline factors that are likely to influence: (1) the emergence of non-state 
certification schemes, (2) the organization of standard-setting processes, and (3) the 
effectiveness of non-state certification schemes.  
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3.1 The emergence of non-state certification schemes 
The central question here is how we can analyze the formation and proliferation of non-
state certification schemes in the forestry and fisheries sectors. It is fascinating in its 
own right to understand patterns of emergence, but it is also fundamental for 
evaluations of effectiveness, as producers self-select into certification schemes. As a 
consequence, we have to consider the possibility that these schemes attract participation 
only from producers that do not have to implement costly management reforms in order 
to comply with the standards. In this section, I propose key factors that are likely to 
influence the formation of certification schemes. 
Inadequate public regulations 
Non-state governance schemes do not exist independently of public rules and 
regulations. I expect that institutions for non-state governance are more likely to be 
formed in policy domains that are weakly regulated by public authorities than in policy 
domains that are strongly regulated by public authorities. The assumption is that non-
state actors will be motivated to fill the governance gaps left open by public authorities, 
supplement weak public rules and regulations with more stringent rules, or compensate 
for the lack of public regimes by creating private regimes (e.g. Cutler, Haufler, and 
Porter 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002). Since the 1980s, environmental NGOs and 
other stakeholders have been increasingly concerned that traditional public regulations 
would not offer adequate protection from deforestation and global forest degradation 
following irresponsible industrial logging in the tropical zone and elsewhere, and that 
governments would fail to address these problems. The lack of a forest convention or 
any other legally binding agreement on forests, gave environmental NGOs reasons to 
seek an alternative solution (Humphreys 1996; Elliott 1999). Similarly, years of 
overfishing that depletes fish stocks have resulted in widespread concern that 
governments were not willing or able to resolve the problem (Phillips, Ward, and 
Chaffee 2003). Hence, environmental NGOs and other stakeholders in the forestry and 
fisheries sectors were motivated to create private governance schemes to compensate 
for what they regarded as insufficient public regulations.  
NGO coalition building and producer targeting 
In many policy fields, including the forest and fisheries sectors, policy networks have 
traditionally involved public authorities, industry associations, and trade unions, with 
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little participation from outside stakeholders such as environmental NGOs. If 
environmental NGOs want participation from industry associations and producers in 
new governance schemes, they have to challenge the exclusive rulemaking authority of 
these policy networks. Because such schemes ultimately depend on the collaboration of 
producers and other stakeholders, NGOs need to build new coalitions in favor of 
certification and labeling (Boström 2006). Such coalition building is likely to occur 
among powerful organizational actors like environmental NGOs, industry associations, 
and “green” companies, domestically as well as in important export markets. The 
inclusion of large, powerful organizations in the certification project can be expected to 
be essential in order to occupy the policy field. Such organizations include companies 
with financial resources and specific expertise (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999), 
retailers with strategic positions along the market supply chain (Overdevest 2004), and 
social movement actors with “moral authority” (Hall and Biersteker 2002).  
Besides building coalitions with powerful organizations, NGOs and advocacy 
groups are likely to target producers to convince them of the benefits of participation in 
certification schemes. Whereas states have the authority to make binding rules for 
natural resource governance and use, non-state certification schemes depend, in 
principle, on voluntary producer participation. In practice, NGOs expend considerable 
effort in persuading or coercing producers to sign onto certification programs, using a 
combination of “carrots” (e.g. reputational or economic benefits) and “sticks” (e.g. 
threats of boycott campaigns). Producers can be regarded as utility-maximizing actors 
that need to be convinced of the economic or reputational benefits of certification and 
labeling. Because participation in fisheries and forest certification schemes requires 
producers to undertake costly management changes they would otherwise not pursue, 
they can be expected to calculate their cost of and their gain from seeking certification. 
In addition to the lure of a price premium on eco-labeled products, incentives for 
participation can take the form of prospects for greater market access or prevention of 
consumer boycotts.  
Transnational activist networks use a range of strategies to create demand for the 
certification and labeling schemes they support, including the naming and shaming of 
producers using practices with which they disapprove. According to Haufler (2001), the 
threat of advocacy group shaming is a major driver of participation in such voluntary 
private sector programs. Environmental groups in support of the MSC will target those 
who harvest the fish, retailers such as Wal-Mart, seafood restaurants, and consumers 
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who buy fish and fish products. Similarly, environmental groups in support of FSC will 
target forest owners and forest companies, commercial purchasers of paper such as 
publishing houses, retailers such as Ikea and Home Depot, and consumers who buy 
forest products. However, NGOs must balance the threat of boycotts and negative 
campaigns for those who do not participate with coalition building and positive 
incentives, as their ultimate goal is to convince producers of the benefits of 
participation. The causal mechanism at this stage, then, is primarily the restructuring of 
incentives for producers that are considering whether or not to sign onto certification 
programs. In the long run, however, successful coalition building could result in the 
development of shared beliefs, values, and objectives (cf. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1999) and influence producers’ evaluations of appropriateness. 
Industry structure 
The effect of NGO targeting is likely to vary among industries and countries. Cashore 
and colleagues (2004) found that the size, ownership, and export dependence of an 
operation are likely to affect its vulnerability to NGO targeting. Because of their public 
and market exposure, large, vertically integrated forest companies involved in timber 
extraction, processing, and sales are more likely to acquiesce to pressure to participate 
in FSC than are small forest owners. Furthermore, economies of scale render it less 
costly for large companies to adopt the relatively stringent FSC standards, prepare for 
certification processes, and respond to certification audits. Dependence on 
environmentally concerned export markets also influences adoption choices; producers 
dependent on environmentally sensitive export markets are more likely to certify in 
hopes of avoiding transnational NGO boycotts and loss of market shares (or to increase 
sales) than are those who sell primarily in a domestic, more easily pacified market.  
Cashore and colleagues (2004) also found that forest companies and forest 
owners in a country with diffuse or nonexistent producer associations are more likely to 
sign onto FSC than are those in a country with strong and unified producer associations. 
A producer-dominated FSC competitor is more likely to emerge in countries or regions 
with strong, well-organized associations because a strong associational system is better 
able to stave off NGO pressure to participate in FSC by undertaking collective and 
strategic industry responses.  
From a commodity supply chain perspective, large companies can dictate the 
terms of buying and selling arrangements up and down the supply chain, resulting in 
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demand for certification (Overdevest 2004). Thus the Unilever food conglomerate, 
which partnered with WWF to create MSC, is well placed to promote certification in the 
fisheries industry. Horizontal modes of diffusion can result from advocacy group 
targeting of companies such as supermarket chains or seafood restaurants at the same 
level in a supply chain (Sasser et al. 2006; Auld, Gulbrandsen, and McDermott 2008). 
Accordingly, I expect that variation in industry structure across sectors and countries is 
likely to result in different responses to NGO pressure to certify.  
Government support 
The rise of transnational corporations, the growth of non-state actors, and the diffusion 
of power in a globalizing economy is sometimes seen as evidence for “the retreat of the 
state” in world politics (Strange 1996). More specifically related to the proliferation of 
institutions for non-state governance, there is talk of “crowding out” traditional 
command-and-control instruments and public policies (e.g. Clapp 2005). Yet 
governments continue to regulate businesses, investors, communities, citizens, and 
natural resource use through legal systems, property rights, taxation, planning rules, and 
the like. States remain the primary units of the international systems through which 
political competition and mobilization are channeled. And most students of international 
relations would agree that states have legitimate rulemaking authority over and beyond 
non-state actors and institutions. I expect, therefore, that government support or lack of 
support may facilitate or hinder the proliferation of non-state certification schemes.  
There are several ways that states could influence the emergence and spread of 
non-state governance schemes. (1) They could grant legitimacy directly to non-state 
governance institutions by delegating rulemaking authority (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 
1999), or more indirectly by expressing moral support for the institutions (Boström 
2003b). Government support could enhance the credibility of private schemes and 
strengthen perceptions that pursuing the certification track is appropriate action for 
environmentally concerned companies. (2) States could facilitate market acceptance of 
certification and labeling schemes through public procurement policies. Of course, if 
governments favor one certification scheme over another in public procurement 
policies, it would be a strong signal to firms considering various options. States could 
also impede the spread of non-state governance schemes by rejecting particular schemes 
or labels, as witnessed when the British government concluded in 2004 that several 
forest certification schemes did not meet public procurement requirements for timber 
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from legal and sustainable sources (Gulbrandsen and Humphreys 2006). (3) States 
could facilitate private sector governance schemes at a more practical level by tendering 
knowledge, expert advice, and financial support in the development and implementation 
of such initiatives (Boström 2003b). I expect that these forms of government support 
will facilitate the emergence and proliferation of non-state certification and labeling 
schemes. In sum, government support is likely to influence not only producers’ cost-
benefit calculations concerning participation in certification schemes, but also their 
evaluations of legitimacy and appropriateness.  
3.2 The organization of standard-setting processes 
Non-state standards institutions constitute governing arenas that assemble various 
stakeholders, regulate their interactions, and provide opportunities for learning and 
mutual adaptation of behavior. When we talk about an institution as a governing arena, 
we are interested in “the access of actors to problems and the access of problems to 
decision games” (Underdal 2002: 24), as well as processes of learning, inclusion, and 
adaptation (Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Governing arenas must have mechanisms for 
aggregating preferences into collective decisions such as decision rules and procedures. 
Standard setters must also decide on the type of actors that should be allowed to 
participate in rulemaking, and what role they should play in the governance process. In 
this section, I examine how organizational design is likely to influence standard-setting 
processes and outcomes. 
Organizing the rulemaking process 
The manner in which rules are developed and agreed upon can be expected to 
distinguish legitimate rules from those lacking legitimacy (Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn 
2006: 91). I expect that the level of inclusiveness in standard-setting projects is 
particularly important for the unfolding of the process and what it produces. 
Inclusiveness refers to the degree to which a broad range of stakeholders is included in 
standard development and on the governance bodies of standards organizations. 
Participation by a broad range of stakeholders, representing economic, ecological, and 
social interests, can be expected to enhance the legitimacy and credibility of a 
certification scheme among local communities, professional purchasers, customers, and 
the general public. Environmental NGO participation is likely to be particularly 
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important owing to the “moral authority” (Hall and Biersteker 2002), specific expertise, 
and “symbolic capital” (Boström 2006) of NGOs in the environmental realm.  
On the other hand, producers can be expected to operate under the belief that 
those who must actually implement sustainability standards ought to develop or 
significantly influence the standards (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004). If producers 
feel excluded from standard development or deprived of real decision-making power, 
they are more likely to leave the process. There could also be a tradeoff between 
inclusiveness and decision-making efficiency; with an increasing number of participants 
involved in standard-setting processes, it may become more difficult to agree upon 
standards and governance procedures. The analysis must therefore be sensitive to the 
interacting effects of the various variables, where one variable may pull in one direction 
and another variable may pull in the opposite direction. 
The outcome of the standard-setting process is likely to depend upon 
participation patterns. When industry associations and producers dominate rulemaking, 
their interest in keeping adoption costs as low as possible would suggest that the 
standard-setting process is likely to result in relatively flexible and discretionary 
standards. By contrast, the outcome in a multi-stakeholder arrangement is likely to be 
more stringent standards, because environmental NGOs tend to advocate relatively 
demanding environmental protection measures and base their arguments on specific 
knowledge claims supporting such measures. I expect that producers who participate in 
inclusive, multi-stakeholder, standard-development arrangements are more likely to 
accept stringent standards than are those who participate in industry-dominated 
arrangements. This acceptance can result from negotiations and social interactions with 
NGOs and other stakeholders that are likely to advocate stringent standards. Producers 
who believe that the standards have emerged from a process that is fair and equitable 
can also be expected to be more likely to accept stringent standards than are those who 
feel no sense of ownership of the outcome (cf. Franck 1990). Hence, social interactions 
and collaboration in standard-development processes may contribute to learning among 
the participants and a redefinition of their interests.  
Organizing for accountability 
Whereas the literature on accountability has tended to focus on accountability structures 
and mechanisms in democratic nation-states, globalization processes and transboundary 
challenges have led to the emergence of governance arrangements beyond the nation-
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state and to a renewed interest in accountability among scholars. Accountability is a 
source of democratic legitimacy, not only in nation-states but also in new forms of 
transnational governance arrangements. As Grant and Keohane (2005: 1) have stated: 
“If governance above the level of the nation-state is to be legitimate in a democratic era, 
mechanisms for appropriate accountability need to be institutionalized”.  
The creation of non-state standards organizations can be seen as an effort by 
civil society organizations or industry associations to institutionalize accountability 
mechanisms beyond the nation state. These organizations cannot simply replicate the 
traditional, territorial accountability structures in democratic states (cf. Grant and 
Keohane 2005), but they could create new tools and mechanisms that could be more 
effective in holding producers to account than could traditional government regulations. 
One way to organize for accountability is to create requirements and procedures to 
enhance the answerability of producers that adopt standards and to enhance control over 
them. Producers that adopt certification standards must consent to regular inspections of 
their practices and must accept the consequences of noncompliance. A certificate from a 
credible organization may, in turn, reassure relevant constituents and market players 
that a company is assuming responsibility for its conduct.  
Another way to enhance accountability is to create an organizational capacity for 
responsiveness to relevant constituents. In the absence of the exclusive rulemaking 
authority of the state, a non-state standards organization must depend on the voluntary 
participation of producers and must be granted legitimate rulemaking authority from all 
the stakeholders it claims to represent. Just as public agencies must be responsive to the 
needs of clients, “customers”, and the general public, a standards organization must be 
responsive to a broad range of stakeholders and manage the diverse expectations 
generated outside the organizations (cf. Romzek and Dubnick 1987, 1994). An 
organizational capacity for responsiveness to clients and external constituents could be 
enhanced by such measures as including relevant groups in the standard-setting process, 
consultation with stakeholders in certification proceedings, transparent decision making, 
opportunities for complaints, and procedures for dispute resolution.  
In short, I expect that standards organizations can enhance accountability 
through instrumental organizational design. However, sociological institutionalists 
remind us that organizations may adopt certain procedures and tools because the actions 
of an entity must be acceptable or appropriate within a certain institutional framework. 
From this perspective, particular accountability recipes could be seen as “rationalized 
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myths” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) that spread rapidly in both private and public 
organizations. It is interesting to explore, then, not only how standard setters organize to 
enhance accountability, but also why they adopt certain accountability tools and what 
effects those tools have on producer behavior.  
Organizing the science-policy dialogue 
Science can be assumed to constitute a platform for discussing and negotiating 
standards. It would be difficult to imagine how standard setters could develop 
prescriptive rules about sustainable resource management in the absence of credible 
knowledge about the causes, consequences, and possible solutions of the environmental 
problem at hand. Although the influence of scientific knowledge in rulemaking 
processes must be investigated empirically, it seems safe to assume that science plays a 
role in the management of all diffuse, transboundary, and complex environmental 
problems.  
In one sense, standard setting is a way of translating, simplifying, and 
transforming complex scientific, technological, or social knowledge to a set of explicit 
rules. Standard setters must understand, interpret, and operationalize knowledge, and 
must decide what knowledge to include and exclude in the process. Moreover, because 
certification standards are prescriptive rules that direct behavior – the assumption being 
that following the rules will result in environmental improvements or other benefits – 
standard setters need to convince producers and other target groups that the standards 
are based on the best available knowledge. Whereas scientific knowledge may or may 
not facilitate agreement on new standards, standard-setters can be expected to refer to 
science and expert knowledge in order to enhance the credibility of new standards and 
to convince relevant audiences that the standards are based on reliable and valid 
knowledge. 
Work on the negotiated boundary between science and policy has challenged the 
idea of an objective science disassociated from the political struggles of interest groups 
and governments as well as the assumption that science speaks truth to power (e.g. 
Jasanoff 1987, 1990; Litfin 1994; Underdal 2000; Mitchell et al. 2006). The 
stakeholders who make policy-relevant knowledge claims are more numerous and 
heterogeneous than ever before, and the process of translating knowledge to rules and 
policies is becoming increasingly complex (Gibbons et al. 1994; Nowotny, Scott, and 
Gibbons 2001). Science often seems to be contested and politicized in modern society; 
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scientific knowledge may even worsen political controversies about environmental 
policies (Sarewitz 2004). Yet, science seems to play a critical role in the expansion and 
proliferation of standardization processes. The success of new organizational recipes 
lies, in part, in their grounding in organizational ideas associated with modern 
institutions of science, rationality, universalism, and homogeneity (Meyer and 
Jepperson 2000).  
I expect that the emergence of non-state standard-setting projects creates a 
growing role for actors outside the traditional research sector to produce and use 
knowledge that can influence environmental rules and institutional design. Traditional 
policymaking systems in the forestry and fisheries sector can be described as 
hierarchical systems (cf. March and Olsen 1989) in which participation to the science-
policy dialogue is controlled by public authorities. These systems have traditionally 
been dominated by public authorities, industry and trade associations, and scientific 
communities with privileged access to the science-policy dialogue. By contrast, multi-
stakeholder standard-setting systems can be depicted as open or loosely structured 
systems (cf. March and Olsen 1989), with few formal or practical barriers for 
stakeholders who seek to provide scientific input. I expect that multi-stakeholder 
standard-setting projects will give environmental stakeholders wider access to the 
science-policy dialogue than traditional policymaking has done, owing to the 
differences in organizational form. Whereas environmental stakeholders have 
traditionally had limited access to the science-policy dialogue in public rulemaking 
processes, they participate on a level playing field in multi-stakeholder standard-setting 
projects. In industry-led programs, however, environmental organizations can be 
expected to have limited access to the science-policy dialogue.  
3.3 The effectiveness of non-state certification schemes 
Beyond serving as governing arenas, some non-state governance schemes also qualify 
as organizational actors with the capacity to direct the behavior of organizational 
members. Standards are “soft regulations” existing outside organizations and issued 
without the authority that managers are granted within organizations (Ahrne and 
Brunsson 2004), but standard setters often create formal organizations in order to 
enhance their capacity to act. In the following, I examine how producer participation, 
the stringency of standards, system operation, and consequences of noncompliance can 
be expected to interact and influence the effectiveness of certification schemes.  
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Producer participation 
In principle, participation in certification schemes is voluntary. The more producers that 
participate in a certification scheme, the more likely it is that it will change widespread 
producer practices. Without a critical mass of producers, a voluntary scheme is unlikely 
to change producer practices in ways that lead to improvements in the biophysical 
environment. Accordingly, the adoption of a certification scheme can be expected to 
influence its problem-solving effectiveness. In addition to considering measures such as 
forest area certified and the proportion of certified to uncertified forests, however, it is 
critical to examine patterns of standards adoption. Because participation in certification 
schemes is voluntary, it is possible that only producers who face relatively low costs of 
standards adoption choose to participate. If producers who face substantial compliance 
costs were to systematically opt out of certification schemes, the net impact of 
certification would be low (Auld, Gulbrandsen, and McDermott 2008). Patterns of 
adoption can be expected to be related to the stringency of the standards, which I turn to 
next.  
Stringency of the standards 
The stringency of certification standards is likely to be critical for the environmental 
problem-solving capacity of a certification scheme. By stringent standards, I mean that 
they are prescriptive and comprehensive, requiring forest companies to limit harvesting 
near rivers and protected areas for example, and fishing vessels to use particular fishing 
gear and methods. As a point of departure, we may expect that the more stringent the 
environmental standards, the greater the likelihood that they would change forestry and 
fishing practices in ways that lead to environmental amelioration. Stringent certification 
standards may compel producers to go beyond compliance with public rules and 
undertake costly reforms that they otherwise would not pursue. A standard requiring 
large forest set-aside areas, for example, would preserve larger high conservation-
valued forest areas than would a less stringent standard. Although we should not expect 
a linear relationship between standard stringency and impact on the biophysical 
environment, stringent standards are likely to increase the ameliorative effects of a 
certification scheme on producer practices.  
On the other hand, stringent standards could also have negative effects on the 
overall effectiveness of certification schemes. First, there could be an inverse 
relationship between stringency and the adoption of schemes by producers, because 
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producers do not necessarily accept schemes with demanding and intrusive standards 
(Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004; Gulbrandsen 2004). Unless participation in 
schemes with stringent standards is rewarded is some way, we may expect that the more 
stringent the certification standards, the less likely it is that a wide range of producers is 
willing to participate voluntarily. More specifically, we may expect that only 
environmental frontrunners, which could adopt standards without having to undertake 
costly management reforms, would find it attractive to participate in a scheme with 
highly demanding and prescriptive standards. Enthusiasm for stringent certification 
schemes among environmental laggards, where the need for changing management 
practices is more urgent, can be expected to be low. Consequently, stringent standards 
could reduce the scheme’s capacity to attract widespread participation from producers 
and to change broad-scale management practices, which would obviously impede the 
scheme’s environmental problem-solving capacity.  
Second, there could be an inverse relationship between compliance and the 
stringency of the standards, because producers do not necessarily have the capacity to 
implement and comply with highly demanding standards. Even if producers would like 
to change management practices and comply with stringent standards, they may fail to 
do so simply because the standards are too demanding. As a result, the level of 
noncompliance can be expected to be higher in schemes with stringent standards than in 
schemes with lenient standards.  
Third, it is critical to recognize that standards are not neutral; the first movers 
who create the rules can tailor them to match their technical and operational capacities, 
resulting in higher switching costs for late movers (Mattli and Büthe 2003; Auld, 
Gulbrandsen, and McDermott 2008). Accordingly, standards secure advantages for 
certain producers and disadvantages for others, and stringent standards could be tailored 
to enhance the competitive advantages of first movers.  
To summarize, I do not expect to find a simple relationship between stringency 
and effectiveness. On the one hand, stringent standards could direct producers’ behavior 
and force them to undertake reforms they otherwise would not pursue; on the other 
hand, there could be an inverse relationship between stringency and producer 
participation and, likewise, between stringency and compliance. The empirical analysis 
will have to shed light on when, and under what conditions, stringent standards are 
likely to result in changes in problem-relevant behavior among a wide range of 
producers – not merely among environmental frontrunners.  
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System operation 
A certification scheme may be performance based (focusing on outcome), management-
system based (focusing on process), or based on some combination of the two. In a 
performance-based scheme, compliance with standards must be verified in on-the-
ground audits. When performance-based standards are assessed, the forest or fishery 
itself is evaluated. For example, a certifier may inspect a forestry organization to 
ascertain if it has set aside primary forests of a certain size or a certifier may inspect a 
fishing vessel to see if appropriate fishing gear and practices are in use.  
By contrast, a management-system-based scheme does not dictate compliance 
with any specific performance level before issuing a certificate, but requires that 
continual process improvements be demonstrated in audits. When system-based 
standards are audited, it is not the forest or fishery that is assessed, but the forest or 
fishery management system. For example, a certifier may inspect an organization to see 
if it has implemented adequate management plans, internal monitoring systems, and 
reporting procedures. An undertaking certified in accordance with system-based 
standards is usually required to have an environmental policy and goals in place, but can 
generally decide the environmental performance level it aims for. The management-
system-based approach is sometimes perceived as being more dynamic than 
performance-based systems because of the requirement for continuous improvement 
rather than clearly defined and in some cases static criteria.  
On the other hand, management-system-based certification has been criticized 
for providing little incentive for firms to go beyond the minimum requirement of 
meeting domestic laws and regulations (e.g. Clapp 2005). Moreover, compliance with 
these standards can, in principle, be verified without a visit to the forest or the fishery. 
Because performance-based schemes require compliance with substantive on-the-
ground standards, we may expect that they are more likely to modify forestry and 
fisheries practices in ways that lead to less environmental deterioration than will 
management-system-based schemes.  
Compliance with the standards, rules, and policies of non-state standards 
organizations may be based on first-party verification (self-inspection), second-party 
verification (inspection by an industry or trade association), or third-party verification 
(inspection by an independent auditor). It is generally assumed that third-party audits of 
management practices and performance would constitute a stronger push toward 
compliance than would first-party or second-party inspections.  
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The assumption that third-party auditing will result in improvements is essential 
to all certification schemes, but auditing practices are likely to vary among schemes. 
Regular third-party audits by independent certification bodies could enhance 
compliance with standards and continuous performance improvements in certified 
companies. On the other hand, if auditing practices are lenient or based on highly 
discretionary standards, obligations to report performance and verify compliance with 
standards could merely become ceremonial rituals aimed at justifying the business-as-
usual situation (Power 1997). In this view, prescriptions about consultation with 
stakeholders in standard-setting processes, accreditation of independent certifiers, third-
party auditing, and the like are rationalized myths that spread rapidly in both public and 
private organizations. Thus the analysis needs to explore the behavioral consequences 
of the certification and auditing process, to which I turn below.  
Consequences of noncompliance 
From the perspective of rational institutionalism, the key to achieving high levels of 
compliance lies in the role of enforcement; to be an effective certification scheme, the 
consequences of noncompliance with certification standards must be tangible enough to 
increase the costs of noncompliance and thus deter violations of rules (Breitmeier, 
Young, and Zürn 2006). In the case of noncompliance, the certification body would 
normally issue so-called Corrective Action Requirements and give the producer 
sufficient time to improve operations, but the certification body may also suspend the 
certificate if the producer fails to correct serious breaches with standards. In some 
schemes, the consequences of failing to comply could also lead to expulsion from an 
industry association.  
As a point of departure, I expect that the more serious the consequences of 
noncompliance, the greater the potential to change behavior and the more effective the 
certification scheme will be. Failure to comply with certification standards may not only 
result in the loss of a certificate, but could result in loss of reputation and trust. If, on the 
other hand, there are no tangible consequences for noncompliance, certified producers 
would, from the rationalist perspective, have no incentive to change their practices in 
order to comply with demanding standards. Among the causal mechanisms believed to 
mediate between a certification scheme and improved environmental practices in 
forestry and fisheries, auditing largely involves the restructuring of incentives. 
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However, as a result of repeated interaction between producers, certification 
bodies, and other stakeholders, producers may begin to follow rules without considering 
if rule following is compatible with their material self-interest. This behavior would be 
consistent with what we would expect from actors motivated by the logic of 
appropriateness, and suggests that compliance verification becomes less important over 
time than does maintaining a dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders in order to 
meet their expectations and needs. Through their participation in certification schemes, 
producers, as stewards of natural resources, may internalize norms and rules about 
appropriate conduct, and incorporate compliant behavior into standard operating 
procedures. Resource managers may comply with rules because it is the right thing to 
do, or habitually, without case-by-case deliberations about the costs and benefits of 
compliance.  
Engaging actors in such complex social networks as multi-stakeholder standard 
development and certification processes can produce positive results over and above the 
development of compliance mechanisms (cf. Reinecke 1998). As noted by Breitmeier 
and colleagues (2006: 155), the imposition of penalties or the provision of rewards may 
prove effective in eliciting compliance at the margin, but “even well-endowed public 
authorities would run into trouble right away unless most subjects complied with the 
relevant rules and commitments most of the time without regard to the impact of 
punishments and rewards”. I expect, then, that engaging producers in standard-setting 
and certification processes can elicit compliance with rules and behavioral change, 
regardless of the character of the compliance system. Indeed, rational models of 
compliance-enforcement systems, if taken at face value, can have misleading practical 
implications and may even undermine the trust they are meant to build (Hasenclever, 
Mayer, and Rittberger 1997: 170). Expanded monitoring and auditing and rigorous 
compliance verification systems can lead to an ever-growing demand for more 
monitoring and auditing (Power 1997). The result could be that auditing becomes an 
end in itself rather than a means to change problem-relevant behavior.  
 
4. Research design and case selection 
The empirical part of this thesis consists of a collection of articles that examine the 
emergence and effectiveness of certification schemes. The following articles comprise 
the case studies of the thesis:  
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1. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2006) “Creating Markets for Eco-labeling: Are Consumers 
Insignificant?” International Journal of Consumer Studies 30 (5): 477–489. 
 
2. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2008) “Accountability Arrangements in Non-State Standards 
Organizations: Instrumental Design and Imitation”, Organization 15 (4): 563–583. 
 
3. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2004) “Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can 
Forest Certification Fill the Gaps in the Global Forest Regime?” Global 
Environmental Politics 4 (2): 75–99. 
 
4. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2005) “The Effectiveness of Non-State Governance 
Schemes: A Comparative Study of Forest Certification in Norway and Sweden”, 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 5 (2): 125–
149. 
 
5. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2008) “The Role of Science in Environmental Governance: 
Competing Knowledge Producers in Swedish and Norwegian Forestry”, Global 
Environmental Politics 8 (2): 99–122. 
 
6. Gulbrandsen, Lars H. (2005) “Sustainable Forestry in Sweden: The Effect of 
Competition among Private Certification Schemes”, Journal of Environment and 
Development 14 (3): 338–335. 
 
The first two studies examine the formation and design of forest and fisheries 
certification schemes at the global level. In Article 1, I investigate the role of 
consumers, companies, environmental organizations, and governments in the emergence 
and proliferation of non-state certification schemes. The spread of voluntary eco-
labeling schemes is often seen as being driven by aspirations in the business sector in 
order to extract a price premium on eco-labeled products or to gain greater access to 
markets – and by consumer willingness to pay more for products carrying a credible 
label. A rational-economic perspective would lead one to expect that the spread of forest 
and fisheries certification is driven primarily by producers wanting to reap price 
premiums or to exploit competitive advantages, and is made possible by end-consumer 
demand. Drawing on an alternative approach in this article – an approach referred to as 
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“political consumerism” – I investigate what can be gained by viewing the market as a 
site for political activism and agitation rather than merely as a site for economic 
transactions. I am particularly interested in examining the relative importance of the 
environmental group targeting of producers in order to ensure industry participation in 
certification schemes, government support for private initiatives, and end-consumer 
demand. Through a careful examination of the initiation and spread of forest and 
fisheries certification schemes, this article opposes the view that the emergence of 
certification programs must be understood primarily as a market-driven phenomenon, 
with little influence for actors other than producers and industry associations. 
In Article 2, I turn my attention to the organizational design of forest and 
fisheries certification schemes, and how it changes over time. The creation of non-state 
standards organizations could be seen as efforts by civil society organizations or 
industry associations to hold producers accountable for their environmental and social 
performance or nonperformance. A certificate from a credible organization may 
reassure relevant constituents and market players that a company is taking responsibility 
for its conduct. Yet it is unclear to whom the standards organization itself is accountable 
and what is the source of its legitimacy and rulemaking authority. I am particularly 
interested in exploring how non-state standards organizations organize rulemaking and 
governance to create legitimacy for their actions and a higher degree of accountability. I 
compare forest and fisheries certification schemes to determine if the same mechanisms 
can explain the organizational design and evolution of certification schemes in two 
different sectors.  
Article 3 examines the relationship between forest politics and forest 
certification at the global level, particularly on the ability of forest certification to 
amend the omissions of international agreements pertaining to forestry. The purpose of 
this study is to explore the relationship between public and private governance 
instruments and to identify how, and under what conditions, non-state certification 
schemes can be effective as institutions for environmental governance. My point of 
departure is that non-state governance can be seen as an extension of intergovernmental 
efforts to enhance environmental protection in forestry, in the sense that private actors 
step in where public authorities have not succeeded in agreeing on precise and stringent 
rules and fill in the gaps by setting new rules and standards. I begin by reviewing the 
achievements and limitations of international efforts to protect forests and promote 
sustainable forest management. Next, I compare various certification schemes within 
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the forestry sector, and investigate whether or not they can be regarded as successful 
private sector responses to the inadequate international legalization in the forestry 
sector. Most studies have identified certification as being in opposition to 
intergovernmental cooperation on forests, rather than complementing it. By contrast, 
this study opposes the view that non-state governance schemes challenge traditional 
government authority, by showing that such schemes can fill some of the gaps in 
intergovernmental efforts to protect forests and promote sustainable forest management. 
I argue that private policy instruments tend to supplement rather than supplant 
traditional public policy regulation, and that forest certification should be understood as 
complementing international agreements pertaining to forestry.  
Studies 4 through 6 examine various aspects of forest certification in Norway 
and Sweden on the assumption that understanding the emergence and effectiveness of 
forest certification requires detailed case studies. Norway and Sweden are particularly 
deserving of in-depth study for several reasons. First, they have been at the forefront of 
developing and implementing forest certification schemes. This early move makes it 
possible to study non-state rulemaking and enforcement and public-private governance 
interactions over roughly a decade, from the initiation of non-state rulemaking projects 
in 1994 to the situation with highly institutionalized and advanced governance systems 
in 2005. Second, forest certification processes evolved very differently in the two 
countries. In Norway, almost all productive forestland is certified in accordance with the 
environmental management system (EMS) standard, ISO 14001, and the nationally 
developed Living Forest certification scheme. By contrast, the FSC has certified about 
40 percent of the Swedish forestland, and it is considerably larger than a competing, 
landowner-dominated scheme in Sweden. Third, Norway and Sweden are advanced, 
industrialised economies with a high profile on environmental protection issues, and 
both countries have a substantial forest industry, providing an opportunity to study the 
relationship between environmental and economic interests and well-established 
administrative traditions when new governance arrangements are introduced in a 
specific policy field. Fourth, there are some salient structural differences, such as 
industry structure and ownership patterns, between the Norwegian and Swedish forestry 
sectors, providing an interesting point of departure for comparing forest certification 
processes. In sum, Norway and Sweden are interesting to compare, not only because of 
the many similarities they exhibit, but, crucially, because of their differences with 
regard to the development and proliferation of forest certification schemes.  
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In Article 4, I compare and contrast the emergence and effectiveness of forest 
certification schemes in these two countries. Although the two countries are compared 
to explore the emergence and effectiveness of different forest certification schemes, the 
observed differences are also an interesting point of departure for exploring similarities 
in non-state-driven rulemaking processes (cf. Ragin 1987). In addressing these issues, I 
examine a number of variables that influence forest certification choices and the 
effectiveness of certification schemes, particularly the initiation of certification 
processes, inclusiveness in standard development, individual or collective participation 
in certification schemes, system operation, and stringency of the standards.  
Article 5 examines the influence of scientific knowledge in the development of 
environmental protection measures in Swedish and Norwegian forestry. The objective is 
to determine if differences in the environmental stringency of forest policy and 
certification standards can be explained by a variation in the state of knowledge about 
environmental protection needs, the access of various stakeholders to the science-policy 
dialogue, or the relationship of the environmental problem and its solutions to the 
distribution of costs and benefits in the forestry sector. In exploring these questions, I 
compare the influence of various knowledge producers in state-driven and non-state-
driven rulemaking processes to enhance environmental protection in forestry. State-
driven and non-state-driven processes are interesting to compare because the emergence 
of non-state forest certification schemes may have changed the conditions for 
knowledge producers and stakeholders to influence rulemaking. Whereas policymaking 
in state-driven processes is typically highly institutionalized, there are usually few 
formal or practical barriers for stakeholders who seek to provide scientific input in non-
state-driven rulemaking processes. As a result, knowledge producers that usually have 
been more or less excluded from traditional policymaking processes may instead be able 
to influence rulemaking in new types of environmental governance projects. Because 
forest certification requires the translation of complex and often uncertain knowledge 
into concrete certification standards, it is interesting to explore the influence of 
competing knowledge producers such as environmentalists and forestry interests in 
standard-setting processes.  
In Article 6, I investigate the implementation of two competing forest 
certification schemes in Sweden. In many ways, Sweden provides what could 
essentially be called a test-tube environment for studying the implementation of forest 
certification programs and the effects of competition among forest certification 
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schemes. As a major exporter of paper and other wood-based products, it is essential for 
Swedish forest companies and forest owners to demonstrate to customers that they 
comply with sustainable forest management standards. Whereas Swedish forest 
companies are certified in accordance with the FSC standard, the Swedish forest 
owners’ associations rejected FSC and created their own forest certification scheme. 
This situation makes it possible to compare the effectiveness of two competing forest 
certification schemes and to examine how they influence one another. The aim of this 
article is to explore how we can examine the effectiveness of forest certification as an 
institution of environmental governance. Specifically, I assess whether or not certified 
forest companies and forest owners go beyond compliance with legal requirements on 
environmental protection in forestry, and I examine unintended consequences of 
certification (shifting alliances, prevalence of conflict in the forestry sector), as well as 
the effects of competition among certification schemes.  
In sum, in this thesis I have studied the emergence and effectiveness of forest 
certification from the global to the domestic level. In addition, forests and fisheries 
certification are compared at the global level, in order to provide a fuller and richer 
account of the ways in which non-state governance schemes emerge and organize 
standard setting and enforcement. This combination of comparisons across governance 
levels and sectors helps to strengthen the reliability and validity of the findings. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The main contribution of this thesis has been to investigate, theoretically and empirically, 
an under-explored area of contemporary environmental politics: the formation and 
effectiveness of private-sector or non-state governance institutions. In this chapter, I review 
and discuss results from the articles that comprise the empirical part of the thesis. Because I 
present results and discuss conclusions in each article, the purpose of this chapter is to 
review and discuss some overarching themes and findings in light of the research questions. 
Recall the broad research questions I have examined:  
 
• How can we explain the emergence and spread of non-state certification schemes in the 
forestry and fisheries sectors? 
• How and to what extent does the organization of standard-setting processes influence 
standard-setting outcomes?  
• What are the causal mechanisms that link certification schemes and behavioral change; 
and when, and under what conditions, are these mechanisms likely to influence 
behavior? 
 
In examining these questions, I have drawn upon insights from the regime literature, which 
typically focuses on states and their interactions in international environmental regimes; 
and from sociological institutionalism, which typically focuses on organizations and 
institutional environments. I have also reviewed literature on multilevel governance and 
global governance. Although this literature has been helpful in turning our attention to the 
multitude of governance arenas in a transnationalizing world, there is no coherent theory of 
multilevel or global governance that could help us predict or explain the emergence and 
effectiveness of non-state governance schemes. In short, the multilevel and global 
governance literature does not provide us with the analytical tools that could help us to 
generate nontrivial propositions about institutional formation and effectiveness. I contend, 
therefore, that rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are more fruitful 
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points of departure for identifying causal mechanisms and pathways that could mediate 
between institutions and behavioral outcomes. Nascent, empirically grounded work on non-
state governance, social and environmental certification, and NGO activism helped me to 
specify the scopes of validity for the theoretically based causal mechanisms. Drawing on 
this work, I have investigated when and under what conditions the causal mechanisms are 
likely to influence the formation and effectiveness of non-state certification programs. 
Within this context, I discuss in the following results that shed light on each research 
question.  
 
1. Institutional emergence 
1.1 Inadequate public regulations 
Certification and labeling in the forestry and fisheries sectors developed from concerns 
about environmental degradation, resource depletion, and insufficient governmental action 
to address the problems. After decades of intensive commercial exploitation and industrial 
logging, the problems facing forests – deforestation, environmental deterioration, and loss 
of biodiversity – rank among the world’s worst environmental problems. Despite increasing 
concern over global forest degradation and deforestation in the tropics, states have failed to 
agree on a legally binding global agreement for the protection and sustainable use of 
forests. Following years of discussion and numerous failures to develop a legally binding 
forest agreement in the shape of a forest convention or protocol to an existing convention, 
many NGOs hoped for a breakthrough at the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. They were to be disappointed 
yet again, however, when the conference resulted in a statement of forest principles that 
was not legally binding. The NGOs had also become frustrated with the failure of the 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) to promote tropical forest protection. In 
the absence of governmental action on forests, they decided that a governance scheme to 
prevent irresponsible logging and reverse environmental degradation of forests would have 
to be established by private initiative. Forest certification was thus launched as a market-
based tool that could provide more stringent and wider-ranging sustainable forest 
management rules than those agreed upon by governments. The creation of the Forest 
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Stewardship Council (FSC) should be understood, then, as a response from the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and other NGOs to the lack of success on the part of states to 
negotiate a legally binding global forest agreement (Article 3). The goal of the NGOs was 
to harness market forces to steer forest companies and forest owners toward sustainable 
practices.  
Similarly, the establishment of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) was a 
response to increasing concern over the depletion of natural resources and the 
unwillingness or inability of governments to resolve the problem. Overfishing, resulting 
primarily from an overcapacity in the world’s fishing fleets following years of expansion, 
has depleted fish stocks and habitats. It remains the most serious problem in fisheries 
management within national waters (the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone of 
coastal states) and in waters outside national jurisdiction (the high seas). Driven by the 
rapid growth of the world’s fishing fleets, the harvest tonnage from capture fisheries 
quadrupled between 1950 and 1990, but has since leveled off or even declined (FAO 2002). 
In addition to threatening the reproductive powers of a fish stock, overfishing affects 
ecosystems through habitat degradation, vessel pollution, and by-catches of non-targeted 
species. Indeed, there is talk among fisheries scientists of a global crisis in marine capture 
fisheries (Watson and Pauly 2001). In response to the increasing concern over the inability 
of governments to resolve the fisheries’ management challenges, fisheries certification was 
introduced to improve management practices, methods of operation, and the status of 
seriously depleted fish stocks and habitats.  
In sum, intergovernmental efforts on behalf of forests and fisheries were important 
for certification initiatives, in what they did and did not produce. Whereas forest 
certification was a response to the lack of legally binding international rules on forests, 
fisheries certification emerged to supplement what was perceived by NGOs to be 
inadequate international rules to address the challenges facing fisheries.  
1.2 NGO coalition building and producer targeting 
The proliferation of voluntary certification programs for environmentally and socially 
responsible production is often seen as being driven by producers who seek to reap market 
benefits and extract a price premium from labeling. By contrast, I found that most 
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producers decided to participate in such schemes only after intensive NGO campaigns 
(Article 1). As expected, coalition building among actors seeking to convince producers of 
the benefits of certification was crucial in creating support for FSC. WWF and other 
environmental NGOs worked systematically to build coalitions in support of the FSC and 
to include in the coalitions such powerful retailers as Ikea; Home Depot in Canada and the 
United States; and the British-based home center, B&Q. We have seen that WWF 
established the first buyers’ group to create demand for sustainably sourced wood among 
retailers in the UK as far back as 1991, even before the FSC was up and running. Similar 
buyers’ groups were established in a number of other countries. WWF also formed a 
powerful alliance with retailers through the Global Forest and Trade Network to promote 
FSC-certified products. With 22 national Forest and Trade Networks and activities in about 
30 countries, WWF had considerable success in creating demand for FSC-certified 
products, although primarily in Europe and North America.  
There were less NGO activism and direct targeting of producers to persuade them to 
participate in fisheries certification schemes. Instead, WWF partnered with the major 
corporation, Unilever, to create MSC, creating a powerful alliance with one of the world’s 
largest buyers of frozen fish from day one of the scheme’s existence. Although MSC 
became independent of its two founders after its two first years of operation, WWF and 
Unilever continued to support the scheme actively. These two partners also worked with 
MSC to convince supermarket chains of the benefits of supplying MSC-labeled products – 
calling them the “The Best Environmental Choice in Seafood”. They had some success in 
the UK, where the leading supermarket chains, Marks & Spencer, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, and 
Safeway stock MSC-labeled products, and in a few other European countries. A major 
breakthrough in the USA came in 2006 when Wal-Mart, the world’s biggest retailer, 
announced its commitment to source 100 percent of its fresh and frozen seafood supplies in 
North America from MSC-certified sources within five years.  
Although the MSC supporters used a less confrontational strategy in creating 
markets for fisheries certification than FSC supporters did for forest certification, building 
coalitions and creating alliances in favor of certification project were crucial in both cases 
(Article 1). As both are not-for-profit organizations with small budgets and limited 
marketing capacity, MSC and FSC were dependent upon alliances with environmental 
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NGOs, retailers, and donors. Indeed, in the absence of strategic bargaining positions within 
well established producer and supply-chain networks, support from environmental NGOs 
and strategic alliances with powerful retailers were essential in convincing producers to 
sign onto the schemes. Consumers’ actual buying behavior or willingness to pay a price 
premium for eco-labeled products was less important for the emergence of forest and 
fisheries certification schemes. Nonetheless, environmental groups would certainly have 
had less success in their efforts to create markets for eco-labeling without the threat of 
consumer boycotts or the hope of price premiums or greater market access. 
1.3 Industry structure 
The size, ownership, and export dependence of an operation affected its vulnerability to 
NGO targeting. Variation in forest industry structure emerged as a particularly significant 
variable for explaining divergent forest certification choices in Sweden and Norway 
(Article 4). Whereas the big, export-dependent Swedish forest companies responded to 
advocacy group and market pressures by adopting the relatively stringent FSC standards, 
non-industrial forest owners in both Norway and Sweden rejected this scheme because of 
narrower market exposure and their belief that the FSC standards were unsuited for 
certification of small-scale non-industrial forestry. The non-industrial forest owners 
responded collectively to NGO pressure to adopt the FSC standards by creating landowner-
dominated schemes with more discretionary and flexible standards. Their strong 
associational systems facilitated collective and strategic responses to NGO pressure to 
certify. 
The processes investigated here also show that path dependencies occur and create 
effects that shape, constrain, and limit future policy choices (cf. George and Bennett 2004; 
Pierson 2004). As Cashore and colleagues (2004) have argued, certification choices at 
critical junctures create “lock-in effects” (Pierson 1993) that constrain future choices and 
increase the costs of changing the course. It was not predetermined that the Swedish forest 
companies would choose FSC certification merely because they were dependent on export 
markets and were exposed to NGO pressures to certify. In fact, a number of forest 
companies in other countries – comparable to the Swedish companies in size and 
dependence on paper and wood products exports to environmentally sensitive markets – 
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rejected this program and worked instead to create industry-dominated schemes (Cashore, 
Auld, and Newsom 2004). When WWF proposed the establishment of a Swedish FSC 
working group, there was skepticism within the forest companies at first. The forest 
industry tried to create a Nordic Forest Certification Project, but that initiative failed, 
largely because it was boycotted by environmental NGOs in Sweden, Finland, and Norway. 
Instead of supporting the Nordic initiative, WWF and the Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation (SSNC) went ahead and established a Swedish FSC working group, in which 
a written declaration of support for FSC’s principles and criteria was a requirement of 
membership. Following publicly announced preferences for FSC-certified products by 
powerful buyers in the UK and Germany, two of the large Swedish forest companies, 
AssiDomän and Korsnäs, eventually decided that they would support FSC certification in 
Sweden. Under pressure from these companies, all members of the Swedish Forest 
Industries Association collectively agreed to have the association represent them on the 
FSC working group (Article 4).  
Similarly, small-scale forest owners in Sweden and Norway were not predestined to 
reject FSC certification merely because they were less exposed to NGO targeting and 
market pressure than the big forest companies were. Indeed, all the six regional Swedish 
forest owner’s associations (representing the nonindustrial forest owners) agreed 
collectively to join the FSC working group and were close to accepting the proposed FSC 
standards. In the end, however, they withdrew from the working group, largely over 
disagreement with the environmental NGOs over the stringency of some environmental 
standards and because the Sami representatives were making demands related to reindeer 
herding on private forestland in the northern region that the forest associations could not 
accept. This decision paved the way for the creation of a landowner-dominated scheme in 
Sweden (Article 4; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004). If the forest owners’ associations 
had decided to remain on the FSC working group and continue the negotiations with Sami 
representatives and the other stakeholders, there may have been only FSC-certified 
forestland in Sweden today rather than two competing schemes.  
My argument is not that structural variables were unimportant for certification 
outcomes; the size, ownership, and export dependence of an operation clearly influenced 
certification choices. Rather I want to stress that structural variables did not fully determine 
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certification outcomes. Standard setting is a bargaining process and the outcome is a result 
of framing activities, power struggles, and competition for influence among various 
stakeholders. We have seen that the strategies and actions of standard setters influence the 
way the standard-setting process unfolds. In Sweden, the WWF initiated a FSC working 
group, worked systematically to create a coalition in support of FSC certification, and 
succeeded in persuading the big forest companies and the forest owners’ associations to 
participate in the working group. By contrast, the forest owners’ associations initiated the 
Norwegian Living Forests project and assumed leadership in the standard-setting process. 
These associations had the upper hand in Norway, and NGO efforts to convince the forest 
owners of the benefits of FSC certification never succeeded.  
1.4 Government support 
In the global governance literature, the emergence of transnational advocacy networks, 
private authorities, and non-state governance schemes is often taken as evidence supporting 
the claims that the state is less powerful than it has been in the past and that authority is 
being relocated from public to private institutions (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Held and 
McGrew 2002; Rosenau 2003). In the Swedish and Norwegian forestry sectors, however, 
changes in public rules and regulations facilitated the emergence of non-state governance 
schemes, indicating that forest certification should be seen as part and parcel of a new 
approach to governance involving both public and private authorities. This approach is 
based on shared public and private rulemaking authority and cooperative partnerships 
complementing traditional top-down regulation. From the early 1990s onwards, public 
authorities in both Norway and Sweden wanted forest owners to assume greater 
responsibility for environmental care and protection in forestry. State agencies encouraged 
and supported the development of forest certification systems and assisted forest owners 
with practical implementation advice and information. Whereas the new forest policy in 
Sweden was part of a programme of deregulation and liberalization (Boström 2003), 
Norwegian forest owners had always enjoyed a great degree of freedom in managing their 
forests. In both countries, public authorities from the early 1990s onwards wanted forest 
owners to adopt a more serious attitude toward environmental care and protection. But they 
were careful to add that forest certification should act as a supplement to public policy 
 8
instruments and that the forest owners should decide for themselves on the type of 
certification scheme to be implemented.  
The evidence supports the position that states, through the regulatory system and the 
political and administrative culture, influenced non-state rulemaking initiatives and 
encouraged private actors to participate in certification schemes and comply with 
certification standards (Articles 4 and 6; Boström 2003). By focusing predominantly on 
market dynamics and the strategies of non-state actors, many analysts of non-state 
governance schemes tend to ignore or downplay the role of the state and regulatory 
frameworks in the establishment and implementation of these schemes. Although NGO 
activism and market pressure have been important factors in the proliferation of 
certification programs, analysts would be well advised to pay attention to the legal, 
socioeconomic, and political contexts that facilitate or hinder successful implementation. 
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that effective implementation of these programs 
requires well functioning legal systems, forest law enforcement, property rights, and 
national and local forestry administrations that work (Articles 3, 4, and 6).  
In conclusion, non-state certification initiatives cannot fully supplant forest 
legislation and its enforcement by public authorities. In fact, their successful functioning 
seems, in part, to depend on such legislation and enforcement. Non-state certification 
schemes may do little, therefore, to improve the overall protection of forests or other 
natural resources in countries where governmental institutions, legislative frameworks, and 
law enforcement mechanisms are weak. This is a research topic in urgent need of closer 
examination.  
 
2. Organizing standard-setting processes 
2.1 Organizing the rulemaking process 
I proposed that the organization of the standard-setting processes would influence standard-
setting outcomes. One expectation was that inclusiveness in standard-setting processes 
would enhance the credibility and legitimacy of a certification scheme. Another expectation 
was that participation from environmental organizations would result in relatively stringent 
standards, whereas greater participation from business interests would result in standards 
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that are more lenient. We have seen that different interest groups struggle intensively to 
craft the rules and decision-making procedures of non-state governance schemes, indicating 
that there is a belief within interest groups that organizational arrangements are crucial to 
the operation, performance, and effectiveness of these schemes (cf. Boström and Klintman 
2008). Their belief is, in other words, that the organization of rulemaking processes makes 
a significant difference in rulemaking outcomes. But does organizational form really matter 
in the sense of influencing standard-setting processes and outcomes?  
A key finding from the case studies is that inclusiveness in standard development 
and operation enhances the legitimacy and rulemaking authority of non-state governance 
institutions. Whereas the state may grant rulemaking authority to private actors, the 
legitimacy of non-state governance schemes is largely determined by the evaluations of 
environmental organizations, producers, purchasers, and consumers. Because of the 
“symbolic capital” of environmental organizations, their support is vital for the legitimacy 
and rulemaking authority of non-state certification schemes. Environmental organizations 
could be seen as granting legitimacy to certification schemes in exchange for participation 
in the standard-setting process and, ultimately, for influence on producer behavior. 
Participation from producer associations could create a sense of ownership of the standard-
setting outcome and enhance the legitimacy of the scheme among producers who would be 
required to comply with the standards.  
In the case of FSC and MSC, participation from a broad range of environmental, 
social, and economic stakeholders enhanced the credibility of the schemes among 
professional customers and consumers, thus increasing supply-chain support for 
certification (Article 1). I also found that inclusiveness and interaction in standard 
development processes facilitated knowledge dissemination and learning among 
participants (Articles 4, 5, and 6). Inclusiveness in decision-making processes could be 
regarded as a way to enhance collaboration and problem-solving efforts among 
stakeholders with different interests. However, stakeholders who felt deprived of real 
decision-making power or who were unwilling to compromise with other participants left 
the standard-setting groups. As seen in the Swedish FSC process, the forest owners’ 
associations decided collectively to leave the standard development group following 
disagreements with other stakeholders. In Norway, after having agreed with the forest 
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owners to back the Living Forest standards, the environmental NGOs declared a few years 
later that they no longer supported the certification scheme. They were concerned that the 
forest owners would not compromise on key environmental issues in the elaboration of the 
standards. Balancing the formal decision-making powers and rights of various stakeholders 
appears, therefore, to be crucial in non-state governance schemes. If business interests 
dominate rulemaking at the expense of other stakeholders, environmental and social 
movement groups are not likely to support the scheme. Conversely, if environmental and 
social movement groups dominate rulemaking, producers are unlikely to participate and 
implement the rules on a voluntary basis.  
As expected, the empirical evidence shows that environmental standards are more 
likely to be stringent when environmental NGOs are systematically included in standard-
setting processes. Conversely, the standards are more likely to be discretionary and flexible 
when organizational arrangements favor business actors at the expense of other 
stakeholders (Articles 3 and 4). In the FSC, WWF and other NGOs deliberately designed 
organizational arrangements and procedures to eliminate business dominance and to 
encourage collaborative rulemaking. Within the FSC, the environmental and social 
chambers (comprising two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly) can always veto 
proposals they do not support. With only one-third of the votes in the FSC General 
Assembly, the economic chamber cannot dominate rulemaking in the scheme. By contrast, 
forest industries and landowners generally dominate rulemaking and governance in FSC 
competitors like the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) In the 
PEFC Council, voting rights are based on the size of the forest owners’ land, and 
environmental and social stakeholders have no formal voting rights. These different 
organizational forms have resulted in different types of standards and certification 
requirements (Article 2). Whereas FSC certification is generally based on prescriptive, 
performance-based standards, the producer-dominated schemes place greater weight on 
standards of procedure, organizational and management measures, and flexibility in 
applying the standards. In the fisheries certification scheme, MSC, ultimate decision-
making authority rests with the appointed board of trustees, comprising members from 
industry, environmental NGOs, the scientific community, and the seafood retailers. The 
stakeholder council advises the board of trustees, but it cannot veto or overrule decisions 
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made by the board. Similar to FSC in forestry, MSC requires fisheries seeking certification 
to comply with substantive performance requirements; but its standards are narrower than 
FSC’s standards, and exclude social issues such as indigenous peoples’ and worker’s rights. 
The upshot is that initiators of standard-setting programs must carefully consider the type 
of organizational arrangements that are most suitable for achieving their objectives. In 
general, including a broad range of stakeholders such as environmental and social NGOs in 
standard-setting projects is likely to enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the programs, 
but it is also likely to result in relatively stringent standards. Business domination is more 
likely to result in discretionary and flexible standards, but environmental and social 
stakeholder are less likely to support the standards and lend credibility to the scheme.  
On the other hand, we have seen that producers do not always share identical 
interests. If consumers and retailers value environmentally responsible practices, 
environmental frontrunners in the business community could benefit from the adoption of 
stringent standards. Frontrunners can adopt certification standards without having to 
undertake costly management and behavioral changes, a position that obviously provides 
them with competitive advantage vis-à-vis producers who would have to undertake costly 
reforms in order to become certified. First movers can also shape the rules to match their 
technical and operational capacities, resulting in higher switching costs for late movers 
(Mattli and Büthe 2003). In Sweden, for example, the forest companies clearly regarded 
FSC certification as a competitive advantage when dealing with environmentally concerned 
export markets such as the UK and Germany. During the 1980s, as a result of such 
environmental reforms in the forest companies as the development of environmental 
management plans, the hiring of ecologists, and the education of personnel in ecology and 
environmental protection, they were well prepared for the adoption of the relatively 
stringent FSC certification standards. Whereas the Swedish forest companies could benefit 
from environmental preparedness and operations of scale, transaction costs for private 
forest owners practicing small-scale forestry would have been much higher (Article 4).  
Similarly, various environmental NGOs do not always share the same interests, and 
sometimes disagree on strategies or objectives. The FSC is both a site of and a source of 
occasional conflict within the environmental community (Bartley 2007). Within the FSC, 
there is ongoing debate between WWF, an enthusiastic and pragmatic supporter of the 
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scheme, and critical insiders such as Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network. WWF 
would like to see the FSC develop into the world largest certification scheme, and has 
stressed the need for some flexibility to accommodate business interests. By contrast, 
Greenpeace and other environmental NGOs have argued for more stringent certification 
requirements, maintaining that FSC should be an exclusive scheme, in which only the best 
companies can participate. Conflict levels were highest at FSC’s inception and have since 
abated somewhat, but the differing views on what the FSC should be and how it should 
develop are reflected in ongoing discussions within its council and other governing bodies. 
Other environmental organizations criticize the FSC from the outside. In one of the case 
studies (Article 3), I pointed out that the Rainforest Foundation, a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to rainforest protection, alleged in a voluminous 2002 report that FSC 
certification suffers from a number of unacceptable weaknesses. Although FSC responded 
that many of the allegations were inaccurate or outdated, the Rainforest Foundation 
declared that it still would not recommend FSC-certified tropical timber.  
In sum, we see that there can be divergent interest not only among the various 
stakeholders, but also within the environmental community and the business community. It 
is evident, then, that when explaining the outcome of standard-setting processes, one must 
consider the configuration of interests within standard development coalitions. The case 
studies show that the greatest likelihood of business-environmental NGO agreement on 
relatively stringent standards occurs when there are producers who could benefit from 
adopting such standards. Given the credibility that environmental NGOs lend to the more 
stringent certification schemes, environmental frontrunners on the producer side tend to 
favor participation in such schemes. By contrast, those who favor more lenient and 
discretionary standards tend to prefer participation in producer-dominated schemes that 
give them smaller adoption costs and greater influence over standard-setting outcomes.  
It is important to recognize, however, that standard setting is neither an isolated 
event nor a process with a final outcome (Auld, Gulbrandsen, and McDermott 2008). 
Standards are always negotiated and implemented in a specific context and standard setting 
is an iterative process involving adjustment, adaptation, and renegotiation of standards in 
light of new concerns, demands, and knowledge. We have seen that competition between 
NGO-backed and producer-backed schemes influences standard-setting outcomes (Article 
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6). The Swedish FSC standards were initially more stringent and prescriptive than were the 
standards created by the forest owners’ associations. Given the competition for credibility, 
rulemaking legitimacy, and support from stakeholders, however, the two schemes have 
adjusted their standards and become more similar. Whereas FSC has adjusted its rules to 
better accommodate the needs of forest companies, PEFC has changed “upward” in an 
effort to enhance credibility among environmental NGOs and in the marketplace (Article 6; 
Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004). Rather than the two groups engaging in a “race to the 
top” or a “race to the bottom”, the rivalry between the two schemes has resulted in some 
convergence and mutual adjustment of rules.  
The Swedish case study shows that the difference between competing standards 
cannot be too great (Article 6). If a particular standard becomes too stringent, most 
producers will simply choose to participate in a competing standard. But if the competing 
standard is too discretionary and lenient, it is not likely to be supported by NGOs or the 
marketplace. As a result, competing standards are likely to influence one another and the 
space for making mutual adjustments. There is, however, a key difference between NGO-
backed schemes like FSC and producer-dominated programs. Whereas FSC needs to 
demonstrate that it is “best in class” in order to retain environmental NGO support and 
credibility, producer-dominated schemes often need merely to convince important buyers 
that their labels are “better than average” or better than non-labeled products (cf. Cashore, 
Auld, and Newsom 2004; Boström and Klintman 2008). Because producer-dominated 
certification programs are dependent upon support from industry players and supply-chain 
actors, but not necessarily upon widespread support from environmentalists, they do not 
have to be more stringent than competing schemes. The motivation for creating producer-
led programs was, after all, to create a more industry-friendly alternative to FSC. By 
contrast, the legitimacy of FSC rests on its being the most environmentally stringent and 
demanding certification program in the forestry sector.  
2.2 Organizing for accountability 
I have argued that FSC established a model for organizing accountability in non-state 
governance schemes. In the FSC, economic, social, and environmental stakeholders share 
decision-making power, participate in standard-setting processes, and must find 
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collaborative solutions to collective challenges and dilemmas. Such an organizational 
model empowers actors that have traditionally had little influence on the way companies 
and landowners manage forests. As seen in the FSC, a capacity for acting responsively to 
relevant constituents can be enhanced by including of a broad range of stakeholders in 
governing bodies, implementing transparent decision making and consultations in 
certification proceedings, and creating opportunities for complaints and procedures for 
dispute resolution (Article 2).   
The producer-led forest certification schemes that emerged in opposition to FSC 
established an alternative organizational model, in which industry and business interests 
dominate rulemaking and are accountable primarily to industry peers. We have seen that 
forest owners and forest companies did not accept the notion that they ought to be 
accountable to outside stakeholders who, in their opinion, have limited experience, 
inadequate knowledge of the challenges in the forestry sector, and no mandate to regulate. 
As a result, the producer-backed programs initially operated under the strongly held belief 
that those who are required to comply with forest management standards ought to be 
accountable to their peers, and not to environmental stakeholders (cf. Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom 2004). Determining who ought to be accountable to whom and for what should be 
understood, then, as a struggle among stakeholders about how to establish accountability 
arrangements. The emergence of FSC competitors highlights the necessity of a sense of 
ownership of certification schemes among producers (i.e. forest owners and forest 
companies). Forest companies and landowners that rejected FSC certification did not 
contest the idea of accountability, but because they did not trust or approve the FSC-style 
governance model, they decided to develop a different model. 
Notwithstanding the two different governance models, producer-dominated schemes 
have, over time, imitated some of the organizational arrangements in the FSC-style model 
(Article 2). We have seen that producer-backed schemes have constituted themselves more 
or less independent of the producer associations that established them. The have also 
become increasingly open to participation from stakeholders outside the forestry 
community. Over time, we see evidence of some degree of convergence and institutional 
isomorphism in the certification field – the tendency toward organizational homogeneity. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that homogenization within organizational fields is a result of 
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coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes, and normative pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). In the cases of forest and fisheries certification, we have observed all three processes 
at work. Coercive isomorphism has resulted from pressures from environmental NGOs and 
preferences for particular organizational forms from donors, charities, and philanthropic 
foundations. The preferences of funding bodies for FSC, MSC, and similar schemes have 
been crucial to the growth of these organizations and to the construction of a certification 
organizational field (Bartley 2007). Mimetic processes occur when a number of 
organizations imitate a specific organizational model that is considered to be particularly 
legitimate and successful. We have seen that the success of FSC in attracting widespread 
support among market players and NGOs has helped to spread the FSC-style governance 
model, which in turn is legitimated by widely held norms and beliefs about appropriate 
ways of organizing rulemaking and governance in modern society. In addition, normative 
pressures occur as professionals occupy similar positions across a wide range of 
organizations and introduce their occupational principles, norms, and values in those 
organizations. This process is perhaps most apparent in the entire sub-sector of auditing 
activities that did not previously exist. Certification bodies that audit forests and fisheries 
are occupied by professional auditors with similar educational background and value 
systems. These auditors introduce their occupational principles and practices in certification 
bodies, whether they audit the operations of producers certified by MSC in the fisheries 
sector or FSC and FSC’s competitors in the forestry sector. We can observe, then, that 
certification schemes are embedded in particular organizational fields and molded by 
institutionalized norms and values in those fields.  
I have argued, however, that several producer-dominated schemes have adopted 
fashionable organizational recipes to deflect negative attention and criticism rather than to 
enhance responsiveness to critics (Article 2). Consultation with environmental groups, for 
example, could be a way of justifying one’s actions, yet not being answerable to anyone but 
industry peers. By adopting certain organizational arrangements, such as consultation in 
decision-making processes, standard setters can tell their critics that their decision-making 
procedures are “open”, “democratic” and “transparent”. I have argued that procedural 
accountability arrangements could be used to conceal actual power structures and deflect 
criticism. Answering only those questions that the answerable party has decided upon could 
 16
become a meaningless ritual of conduct justification. Accountability requires not only that 
some party asks questions, but also that the responding party recognizes the one making the 
inquiry as being in a position of authority and having a right to ask questions and demand 
answers. In addition, much of the debate about accountability mechanisms tends to reduce 
accountability to questions about improving systems of management and auditing. 
Enhancing accountability solely through expanded monitoring and auditing could, in the 
worst case, become circular and empty of content and could amount to little more than 
procedures and rituals to meet expectations about appropriate conduct (Power 1997; 
Garsten and Boström 2008).  
In early neoinstitutional work, organizations are said to reflect, but never to 
transform, institutionalized norms and values in the environments in which they are 
situated. From this perspective, formal structure is seen as “myth and ceremony” (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977) that merely tend to reproduce overarching metanorms and powerful value 
orientations. My studies support more recent institutional work demonstrating that 
organizations transform institutionalized norms and innovate to create institutional change 
(e.g. Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). Producer-backed schemes have mimicked the 
FSC-style organizational model by enhancing their autonomy and openness to other 
stakeholders, but have acted strategically to maintain control of the standard-setting 
process. Rather than passively absorbing popular organizational recipes, they have adapted 
selectively to institutionalized norms and values by adopting certain recipes while carefully 
filtering out the management prescriptions of which they did not approve. Indeed, 
producer-backed and NGO-backed schemes are struggling to craft the appropriate norms, 
rights, rules, and decision-making procedures in the certification organizational field. 
Whereas environmental NGOs typically have invoked norms and beliefs about stakeholder 
democracy, deliberation, and transparency in institution-building processes, forest owners 
have invoked norms and value orientations related to their sense of independence and 
identity as stewards of their forests. Institution building should be seen, then, as a struggle 
between competing sets of norms and value orientations, with no predetermined outcome 
(cf. Conca 2006). Non-state governance institutions developed in part through collaboration 
between environmentalists and producers and in part through contestation among actors 
who wanted the institutions to serve to advance their values, beliefs, or interests.  
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In conclusion, the empirical material shows that institutional environments 
influence but do not fully determine formal structure in certification schemes (Article 2). 
There is scope for agency and transformation of underlying normative structures in the 
certification field. We have seen that certification schemes have causal autonomy and that 
they are not merely a reflection of configurations of power and interests among 
stakeholders or broader social orders. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that 
organizational recipes and institutionalized norms and beliefs limit the range of available 
options in the certification field, requiring standard setters to choose among a limited range 
of acceptable or appropriate organizational forms. 
2.3 Organizing the science-policy dialogue 
Understanding and addressing complex environmental problems require credible 
knowledge about their causes, consequences, and possible solutions. Scientific knowledge 
can be assumed to constitute a platform for negotiating standards, but standards cannot 
simply be derived from knowledge. All standard-setting processes are likely to involve 
discussions among stakeholders about the credibility of particular knowledge claims, the 
knowledge that should be included or excluded in the process, and the implications of 
knowledge for rule setting. I expected that the influence of particular knowledge producers 
and users in standard-development processes is likely to depend on the organization of the 
science-policy dialogue. One of the case studies (Article 5) investigated the influence of 
competing knowledge producers in Swedish and Norwegian forest certification and public 
policymaking processes. Whereas traditional public policymaking processes have been 
dominated by national forestry authorities and specific forestry research communities, 
NGO-backed standard-setting processes have been both inclusive and stakeholder owned. I 
described public policymaking as hierarchical systems (March and Olsen 1989), in which 
the national forestry authorities have controlled participation (Article 5). The authorities 
granted privileged access to the rulemaking processes to members of the traditional forestry 
research community, who are located at national forestry universities and institutes. 
Competing knowledge producers, particularly biologists and environmentalists operating 
outside the traditional forestry research community, had little access to these processes, 
especially in Norway. By contrast, NGO-backed standard-setting systems could be 
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characterized as loosely structured systems (March and Olsen 1989) with few formal or 
practical barriers for actors who seek to provide scientific input. Scientific knowledge was 
considered a legitimate and authoritative source of reference by all stakeholders, and served 
to build compromises and consensus among them. To be sure, stakeholders often presented 
competing knowledge claims, but they usually trusted scientific research and agreed that 
science should play a prominent role in the standard-setting process.  
Scientific experts, forest owners, environmentalists, and other stakeholders engaged 
in coproduction of knowledge in standard-setting processes. The Norwegian Living Forest 
working group produced a number of reports to facilitate knowledge-based standard 
development for key issue areas (protection of old, large trees and dead wood, harvesting 
methods, forest area protection) and reported results from research and development (R&D) 
projects such as harvesting method test areas. The Swedish FSC working group did not 
initiate R&D projects, but involved experts in the standard-setting process. Some of the 
environmental NGO representatives were biologists who had previously worked for the 
forest companies and had arranged training courses in forest ecology. They frequently 
referred to scientific reports and recommendations to substantiate proposals for strong 
environmental protection measures. The forest industry representatives conceded to the 
pressure for stringent set-aside requirements in the FSC standard, but rejected other 
proposals from the environmentalists, claiming that the scientific evidence of ecological 
impacts was inconclusive. Although the environmentalists invoked the precautionary 
principle in the negotiations, the industry representatives maintained that any provision in 
the standards that would change or restrict forestry practices should be based on firm 
scientific evidence and facts. 
Despite having different interests, we have seen that the parties were able to handle 
scientific uncertainty and resolve controversies in the standard setting process in three 
ways. (1) They agreed upon standards that provided direction for forestry operations, while 
allowing forest owners some flexibility and discretion in applying the rules. (2) In cases of 
disagreement on the state of knowledge and implications for forestry operations, they 
referred to “further research” and the need to adapt standards in light of new evidence on 
the environmental effects of forestry operations. (3) To allow for adjustments, they agreed 
that all standards should be renegotiated after the first five years of operation. By referring 
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to further research, allowing for some discretion in the application of rules, and creating 
organizational procedures for adjustment of rules, the parties were able to manage 
knowledge uncertainty and agree upon standards (Article 5).  
On the other hand, the scientific basis of the agreed-upon standards was not always 
clear. Considerations about the costs and feasibility of implementing, monitoring, and 
verifying compliance with standards were sometimes thought to be more important than the 
state of knowledge about environmental protection needs. In the Swedish FSC standard 
development group, for example, the forest industry representatives rejected requests from 
the environmentalists to prohibit the introduction of exotic species and to ban the use of 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides in forestry. Although they argued that the scientific 
evidence of ecological impacts was inconclusive, there is little doubt that the forest industry 
representatives also considered economic issues.  
To summarize, economic considerations limit the scope for agreement and the range 
of feasible solutions, but the organization of the science-policy dialogue clearly matters as 
well. The Norwegian and Swedish cases show that the influence of knowledge depends 
upon the process by which it is created and, in particular, upon access to the science-policy 
dialogue. It seems that science has a greater chance of overcoming economic interests and 
guiding action in inclusive, deliberative, rulemaking processes than in processes dominated 
by particular interests and groups. As seen in the Swedish and Norwegian standard 
development groups, a process of coproduction of knowledge between various knowledge 
producers and stakeholders could create trust, produce policy-relevant knowledge, and 
facilitate agreement on appropriate rules.  
 
3. The effectiveness of certification schemes 
3.1 Causal mechanisms and behavioral pathways 
FSC arose because of the lack of substantive results from intergovernmental collaboration 
on forest policy. Its principles are not explicitly linked to any set of regional criteria and 
indicators or to any intergovernmental forest policy principles, because FSC seeks to 
provide stricter and more demanding forest management rules than those agreed upon by 
governments. In contrast, we have seen that the MSC standards are based upon the 1995 
 20
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 
This is clearly an attempt to reassure governments that MSC does not seek to establish a 
competing non-state regime to the elaborate international fishery regime, centered on the 
1982 Law of the Sea Convention. A wide range of multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
fishery treaties as well as international soft law (such as the FAO Code of Conduct) 
supplement the ocean law codified in the Law of the Sea Convention. MSC operates within 
this regulatory framework. 
The divergent roles of FSC and MSC are related to different ways in which forests 
and fisheries are governed (Articles 1 and 2). Forests are national resources governed by 
domestic authorities and owners. Although states own three-quarters of the world’s forests, 
most governments have transferred management authority to private companies through 
logging concessions. National laws regulate access to and use of forest, but forest 
companies and private owners are often given great leeway to exploit forestland, and lack 
of forest law enforcement remains a major problem, particularly in developing countries in 
the tropical zone. Forest certification schemes could directly influence the way forest 
companies and landowners manage forests and conduct logging operations.  
In contrast, marine fish stocks are common pool resources managed by governments 
through international collaboration arrangements, and there is little scope for private 
authorities like MSC to influence multilateral fishery management rules. Whereas FSC 
seeks to establish a global standard for well managed forests in the absence of multilaterally 
agreed-upon forest law, MSC essentially aims to enhance compliance with existing 
multilateral and domestic fisheries rules and to improve fisheries management practices 
through performance-based standards and third-party auditing. Because most fisheries are 
under the control of governments, fish stocks require government intervention for their 
conservation. Certification bodies may identify regulations that need to be changed to allow 
for certification, but it is not their task to appeal to governments to change management 
regulations. Rather, the applicant (fishing industry or other stakeholders) may work with 
government regulators to change regulatory frameworks in ways that would allow 
certification of fisheries that do not meet MSC standards (Leadbitter, Gomez, and 
McGilvray 2006). Likewise, if governments believe that certification is vital for the 
economic viability and market access of the fishing industry, they may take the initiative to 
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change management rules to allow for the certification of fisheries. Compatibility between 
government regulations and the standards set by the certification scheme may facilitate 
certification of applicants. In addition, by requiring transparency in the fishing industry and 
increasing control over fishing practices, certification could enhance compliance with 
government regulations and improve management practices. 
I have argued that understanding the influence of fisheries and forest certification 
schemes on behavior requires the identification of causal mechanism and mediating 
behavioral pathways. All studies point to the interaction or interplay between a “logic of 
consequences” and a “logic of appropriateness” – the interplay between rational calculative 
considerations and the internalization of certain principles, norms, rules, and procedures 
about acceptable and appropriate conduct in particular roles or situations. We have seen 
that actors’ perceptions, knowledge, or commonsense may change with learning and with 
the internalization of certain environmental principles, norms, rules, or claims about reality. 
Certain claims are now taken as unarguable facts; that overfishing or clear-felling forests 
have damaging environmental effects, for instance. Such effects may then be interpreted 
normatively (unacceptable/inappropriate) or strategically (bad for business). In particular, 
the internalization of certain principles and norms related to sustainable fishing, marine 
protection, forest protection, and biodiversity conservation among experts, governments, 
laypersons, and market actors have increased the cost of irresponsibly breaching those 
principles and norms. Producers responded strategically to the spread and increasing 
salience of such principles and norms by adopting certification standards to avoid NGO 
targeting and boycotts, to protect their reputations, and in some cases to reap market 
benefits.  
The case studies on forest certification indicate, however, that what originally were 
clearly utility-maximizing adaptations to new norms, principles, and market expectations, 
have, over time, resulted in some degree of learning and internalization of certain 
environmental protection norms among producers. Repeated interaction in organized 
networks such as the Swedish FSC and the Norwegian Living Forests working groups have 
built mutual trust, common expectations of what is right and proper conduct, and the 
internalization of certain norms and rules. Forest owners’ adaptations to new norms and 
expectations seem to have moved through phases, from rational-calculative-based 
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considerations to the internalization of certain new norms and rules for the acceptable or 
appropriate conduct of responsible owners. The emergence of new environmental 
principles and norms and their institutionalization through collaboration in standard 
development groups and certification systems have contributed to the redefining of forest 
owners’ interests and the boundaries of acceptable or appropriate behavior. Rather than 
treating interests as exogenous, this thesis has confirmed the assumption that interest may 
change or even be discovered as a result of social interaction and learning processes. 
The empirical material also indicates that what is considered appropriate has 
changed as participants in certification projects have moved from the early stages of 
initiation, through collaboration in standard development groups, to the highly 
institutionalized and advanced non-state governance systems currently in operation. For 
many private forest owners, appropriate behavior has traditionally constituted responsible 
management of the forests and the bequeathing of the forests to their children and 
grandchildren to be managed in the decades to come. When the certification issue first 
emerged, these forest owners were highly critical, objecting in principle to outsiders telling 
them how to manage their forests. Their opposition to the FSC was based not solely upon 
the stringency of the FSC standards, but also upon the groups that were supporting the FSC 
(Cashore, Auld, and Newsom: 2004: 234). As we have seen, this opposition to the FSC 
helps to explain the formation of producer-dominated schemes in Norway, Sweden, and 
elsewhere. Over time, however, it seems that forest owners have accepted some degree of 
public scrutiny and accountability to outside stakeholders. In general, most forest owners 
now seem to accept environmental protection as a legitimate objective, and realize that they 
need to respect specific environmental considerations in forestry operations. That said, the 
studies also show that when forest owners’ identity as the steward of their forests was 
challenged or threatened, they mobilized to defend that identity, as seen in several post-
certification conflicts among participants in standard development groups in Norway and 
Sweden.  
The upshot is that both rational calculative considerations and considerations about 
acceptable or appropriate behavior are usually at play in social processes, but one may take 
priority over the other, depending on the situation or circumstances (cf. Bernstein and 
Cashore 2007). In general, forest owners now seem to consider certain environmental 
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protection measures in forestry as being appropriate, but we have also seen that the “logic 
of consequences” continues to play an important role in forest management decisions. 
Private forest owners are also influenced by a desire to maintain their independence and a 
strongly held belief that they know best how to mange the forests (Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom 2004), indicating that what is considered appropriate behavior in a particular 
situation or role may be ambiguous (Christensen and Røvik 2002). In some situations, 
forest owners may regard compliance with certification standards as the appropriate action, 
whereas in other situations, forest owners’ considerations about compliance may be 
trumped by a desire to maintain their independence and mange the forests as they always 
have done. The desire of private forest owners to remain independent seems, in turn, to be 
strongly related to their identity as forest owners. When forest owners feel that their 
identity as the steward of their forest is at stake, they will ask themselves: “What is 
appropriate behavior as a forest owner in this situation?” rather than “What do the 
certification rules say to do in this situation?” There is not merely one “logic of 
appropriateness”, then, but several partly competing “logics of appropriateness” that can 
pull in different directions.  
3.2 Problem-solving effectiveness 
What can be said about the effectiveness of forest and fisheries certification schemes as 
institutions of environmental governance? An institution of environmental governance can, 
as I have noted, be considered effective if it solves or alleviates the problem that motivated 
its creation. This problem-solving approach to assessing effectiveness has been 
operationalized as the degree to which forest certification modifies on-the-ground practices 
in ways that reverse or alleviate environmental deterioration in forestry, and the degree to 
which fisheries’ certification changes fisheries practices in ways that stop overfishing, 
depletion of exploited fish stocks, and unsustainable fishing practices. Ideally, this research 
strategy involves investigating not only changes in forestry and fisheries practices, but also 
the causal relationship between adopting sustainability standards and those changes. 
Having identified certain changes in resource management practices following certification, 
we need to determine the relative improvement caused by certification, as compared with 
what would have happened without certification. In this study, however, the ambition has 
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primarily been to identify the conditions that facilitate or impede problem-solving 
effectiveness rather than to examine on-the-ground changes of management practices 
following certification. I have examined the stringency of the certification standards and the 
effects of third-party auditing, based on the assumption that the ability of certification 
programs to improve environmental performance depends, in part, on the stringency of 
sustainability standards and the level of compliance with those standards. I have also 
examined producer participation in certification schemes, based on the assumption that a 
critical mass of producers is necessary to change widespread producer practices in ways 
that result in environmental amelioration. Because producers self-select into certification 
schemes, I have argued that it is crucial to consider not only the proportion of certified 
producers, but also participation patterns.  
Most certification schemes in forestry and fisheries are based on some combination 
of system-based and performance-based standards, but they place different weight on these 
different types of standards. FSC in forestry and MSC in fisheries are primarily based upon 
performance standards, criteria, and indicators, although they also contain some 
management system elements. Compared to FSC, the producer-dominated schemes tend to 
place greater weight on standards of procedure, organizational and management measures, 
and flexibility in applying sustainable forest management standards. Environmental NGOs 
have repeatedly criticized producer-backed schemes for having ecological and social 
standards that are too discretionary and lenient. Indeed, in many regions and on several key 
environmental and social issues, FSC seems to be more demanding than producer-
dominated competitors. There is significant variation, however, in the stringency of the 
producer-dominated schemes. Whereas some producer-backed schemes take an ecosystem-
based approach to forest management, others emphasize the improvement of forest 
productivity and yield (Article 3). Similarly, regionally developed FSC standards vary 
considerably in their environmental and social rigor, primarily because of the multilayered 
governance approach to standards development. We have also seen that standard setting is a 
dynamic and iterative process, and that certification schemes influence each other. As a 
result of competition with FSC and mutual recognition efforts, the Swedish PEFC standard 
has increased its level of stringency since its inception, almost to the level of the Swedish 
FSC standards (Article 6). Nonetheless, some basic differences between environmental 
 25
NGO-backed and producer-backed schemes are likely to persist. As noted earlier, FSC’s 
credibility among environmental NGO supporters and in important markets rests on its 
being the most demanding program in the forest certification field. Certification schemes 
like FSC, which seek to set relatively high standards while simultaneously attracting broad-
scale participation, are involved in a delicate balancing act in attending to the needs and 
expectations of their various stakeholders.  
I expected that regular third-party auditing of management practices would result in 
improvements in forestry and fisheries practices. Although certification bodies are 
entrusted with a great deal of power and discretion, requirements regarding transparency 
and opportunities for stakeholder participation in certification and complaints proceedings, 
control mechanisms, and stringent standards work to hold them and the producers they 
certify accountable to both the standards organizations and outside stakeholders. These 
structures tend to be better developed in multi-stakeholder certification schemes than in 
those dominated by business and industry interests (Article 2). The stringency of FSC and 
MSC standards and the transparency of the schemes facilitate credible auditing. When 
performance-based schemes such as these are audited, the forest or fishery itself is 
assessed. A certifier’s inspection may determine if a forest landowner has set aside old-
growth forest of a certain size, for example, or if a fishing vessel uses appropriate fishing 
gear and practices. When system-based standards are audited, it is not the forest or the 
fishery that is assessed, but the forest or fishery management system. System-based 
standards are frequently criticized by environmental groups because, in principle, 
compliance can be verified without a visit to the forest or the fishery. Consequently, FSC 
can be said to have a greater capacity to change forestry practices in ways that could 
reverse environmental degradation in forests than do many of its competitors.  
Looking at evidence of actual behavioral changes following certification, we see 
that forest companies and landowners that certify have had to change their management 
operations (Articles 4 and 6). Studies of Corrective Action Requirements issued by 
certifiers show significant attention being paid to improvements in internal monitoring and 
auditing in forest organizations. These studies also indicate that forest organizations have 
had to attend to ecological aspects of their management more carefully following 
certification. It seems to be a warranted conclusion, then, that forest certification has 
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resulted in changes in on-the-ground management. But we still know too little about the 
environmental impact and efficacy of forest certification as a problem-solving instrument. 
Neither do we have evidence about differences in the on-the-ground impact of FSC and 
FSC competitors. These are areas in urgent need of closer examination.  
Turning to adoption patterns, we have seen that there are challenges related to self-
selection in voluntary certification programs; when standards are high, only some 
companies and landowners are willing to or have the capacity to participate. In order to be 
effective, forest certification programs need participation from a critical mass of companies 
and landowners. Participation from a few industry leaders could set an example for the rest 
of the industry, but if most companies and landowners reject certification, there would be 
no broad-scale change of forestry practices. An examination of adoption patterns around 
the world show that certified lands are skewed in favor of temperate and boreal forests, 
indicating that forest certification has spread primarily among producers who face 
relatively low adoption costs (Article 3). Patterns of adoption also show that producer-
backed schemes have outperformed the FSC in many countries and regions; by the end of 
2007, they had certified 5.2 percent of the world’s forest, whereas the corresponding figure 
for FSC was 2.4 percent (Auld, Gulbrandsen, and McDermott 2008). The wider producer 
acceptance of the PEFC is an indication that producers tend to prefer participation in 
schemes with less stringent and prescriptive standards than FSC offers. But the character of 
the forest operation and the producer evaluations of legitimacy also influence adoption 
choices. Whereas the large Swedish forest companies chose FSC certification, nonindustrial 
forest owners in both Norway and Sweden opted for PEFC certification, in part because 
they regarded FSC as being geared toward industrial forestry and unsuited for the 
certification of small-scale, nonindustrial forestry. This pattern of adoption indicates that 
whereas nonindustrial owners may reject relatively stringent standards because of the high 
fixed costs of preparing for and responding to certification audits, large companies can 
afford to participate because of the benefits of economies of scale. Accordingly, 
certification schemes may have consequences – such as favoring large-scale over small-
scale forestry – that were not intended or anticipated by those who created these schemes.  
In sum, there is clearly a dilemma in setting stringent standards that would compel 
producers to undertake reforms they otherwise would not pursue, while simultaneously 
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ensuring broad-scale participation. Although a few certification frontrunners could adopt 
stringent standards at a relatively low cost and obtain a competitive advantage in markets 
that value certified wood, the majority of producers will have to be convinced of the 
benefits of participation or coerced into adopting standards by activist targeting and 
campaigns.  
 
4. Concluding remarks and directions for further research 
Certification schemes have emerged in recent years to become innovative and dynamic 
institutions for non-state environmental governance. This thesis shows that an 
understanding of patterns of emergence is fundamental to an assessment of the 
effectiveness of certification schemes. Given that producers self-select into certification 
schemes, one must account for adoption decisions in order to understand these patterns. We 
have seen that adoption decisions are influenced by the nature of the certification scheme, 
NGO pressure to certify, dependence on export markets, industry structure, and government 
support. Data on adoption patterns around the world show that forest certification has 
spread primarily among producers in developed countries who may face relatively low 
compliance costs. Similarly, we have seen that certification has proliferated among 
fisheries in Europe and North America, but not in developing countries. Patterns of 
adoption continue to raise questions about the effectiveness of certification initiatives. More 
research is needed on the economic, political, and social factors that facilitate or hinder the 
spread of certification initiatives in developing countries. 
Following the proliferation of private governance arrangements, some scholars talk 
of a “crowding out” of traditional command-and-control instruments and public policies. 
This study shows that non-state certification schemes in the forestry and fisheries sectors 
tend to supplement rather than supplant international and domestic regulations. This finding 
is consistent with recent comparative studies of the spread of “new” environmental policy 
instruments, such as eco-taxes, voluntary agreements, and eco-labels (cf. Jordan, Wurzel, 
and Zito 2003). The case studies show not only that certification schemes are affected by 
public regulations and national policy styles or administrative cultures, but also that they 
influence public policy making and enactment. Because forest certification schemes require 
adherence to national laws and regulations, they may strengthen compliance with 
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environmental laws and provisions – where such regulations exist. By conducting annual 
field inspections in selected areas, certification bodies can, to some degree, verify 
conformity to both private and public environmental protection rules. On the other hand, 
considering the limited capacity of public authorities to control forestry operations, field 
inspections of forestry operations may be left increasingly to private certification bodies 
and their annual audits. Developments in Sweden and Norway suggest that private 
authorities may gain influence at the expense of public authorities such as forestry 
administrations and local municipalities. As noted in one of the case studies (Article 4), that 
is not say that demands on and control of forestry operations are weakened, but that 
regulatory systems change with private actors accepting more responsibility for rulemaking 
and compliance verification. 
States have, in general, been more skeptical about certification schemes in fisheries 
than about certification schemes in forestry, primarily because of differences in the way the 
two resources are governed. Through the development of prescriptive and detailed fishery 
eco-labeling guidelines within the FAO, states have even taken steps to regain control of 
rulemaking in the fishery sector. Thus, it is clear that states with a significant stake in 
fisheries governance are not willing to leave the creation of labeling rules and procedures 
completely to the discretion of non-state actors, and they are able to regain some control 
over non-state rulemaking. In recent years, however, there seems to have been a shift 
among governments away from skepticism about MSC and toward acceptance of fisheries 
certification as a helpful supplement to international fisheries regulations and national 
policies.  
All articles in this thesis focus on the ongoing reshaping of rulemaking authority 
through the proliferation of transnational governance schemes, based on the support of 
firms, NGOs, and consumers, rather than on traditional state sovereignty. The state no 
longer has exclusive policy-making authority, but shares that authority with non-state 
bodies that seek to fill the policy void where states have been unable or unwilling to 
provide governance. Unlike the predominant view in the global governance literature, 
however, my research shows that the state influences non-state rulemaking projects and 
remains a critical actor in the successful implementation of non-state governance schemes. 
The spread of new instruments and modes of environmental governance is evidence of a 
 29
process of state, market, and civil society transformations and “governance with 
government”, rather than a “retreat of the state” and “governance without government”. 
It is critical to recognize, then, that private and public rulemaking processes are 
closely intertwined; that private regulatory regimes influence public regulatory regimes, 
and vise versa; and that the absence of one affects the dynamics in the other. The process of 
private and public institution building is part of a broader effort to address collective 
problem complexes. More research is needed on the combined effects of certification and 
governmental, intergovernmental, and civil society efforts to address urgent sectoral 
problems like deforestation and overfishing. In a similar vein, the role of certification as an 
integral part of initiatives to address inter-sectoral problem complexes such as loss of 
biodiversity, land use change, and climate change, is a challenging area for future research.  
With respect to macro-level institutional interactions, a critical area of study is the 
effect of the evolving certification field on the policies of multilateral institutions such as 
the international trade regime. Several studies have examined the ways in which 
international trade law may hinder the spread of certification and eco-labeling schemes. 
Although existing international regimes may constrain certification efforts, certification 
schemes could also influence governance efforts in these regimes by setting benchmarks 
and standards for good practice. This area remains a critical one for future research on the 
institutional interactions between private and public governance efforts.  
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